Chinese legal and political framework for the use of the Northern Sea Route

The Northern Sea Route (NSR) is an Arctic Sea route along the coast of Russia, opening direct communication between Europe and Asia through the waters of the Arctic Ocean. Climate change and shrinking ice cover are making the NSR increasingly accessible to shipping, promising a significant reduction in travel distances and times between East Asia and Europe. For China, a major trading power, this opportunity is of strategic importance: the route through the Arctic reduces the route from Chinese ports to Europe by 40-50 % compared to the traditional route through the Suez Canal, saving time and transportation costs. In addition, the Arctic route avoids global shipping bottlenecks (such as the Strait of Malacca) and geopolitically tense regions, improving the reliability and safety of transportation.Over the past decade, China has significantly increased its interest and activity in the Arctic. Even though China is not an Arctic state, the changes taking place in the region directly affect its climatic conditions and economic interests. Understanding the importance of the NSR, China has developed a political and legal strategy for its use based on respect for international law, cooperation with Arctic States, and integration of the Arctic into its own development initiatives. This paper examines the international legal framework of the NSR regime and the PRC’s policy aimed at its development, with a particular focus on China’s goals in the light of existing international treaties and agreements.

Keyword：Northern Sea Route; China’s Arctic policy; international legal framework; Ice Silk Road; Sino-Russian cooperation

Китайская правовая и политическая база для использования Северного морского пути

Аннотация: Северный морской путь (СМП) — это арктический морской маршрут вдоль побережья России, обеспечивающий прямое сообщение между Европой и Азией через воды Северного Ледовитого океана. Изменение климата и сокращение площади ледового покрова делают СМП все более доступным для судоходства, что обещает значительное сокращение расстояний и времени следования между Восточной Азией и Европой. Для Китая — крупной торговой державы — этот шанс имеет стратегическое значение: маршрут через Арктику сокращает путь из китайских портов в Европу на 40–50% по сравнению с традиционным маршрутом через Суэцкий канал, позволяя экономить время и транспортные расходы. Кроме того, арктический маршрут позволяет избежать глобальных транспортных узких мест судоходства (например, Малаккского пролива) и геополитически напряженных регионов, повышая надежность и безопасность перевозок.

За последнее десятилетие Китай значительно увеличил интерес и активность в Арктике. Несмотря на то что Китай не является арктическим государством, происходящие в регионе изменения напрямую затрагивают его климатические условия и экономические интересы. Понимая важность СМП, Китай разработал политическую и правовую стратегию его использования, основанную на уважении международного права, сотрудничестве с арктическими государствами и интеграции Арктики в собственные инициативы развития. Данная работа рассматривает международно-правовую базу режима СМП и политику КНР, направленную на его развитие, с особым акцентом на цели Китая в свете действующих международных договоров и соглашений.

Ключевые слова: Северный морской путь; арктическая политика Китая; международно-правовая база; Ледяной шелковый путь; российско-китайское сотрудничество

Introduction

The Northern Sea Route (NSR) is an Arctic Sea route along the coast of Russia, opening direct communication between Europe and Asia through the waters of the Arctic Ocean. Climate change and shrinking ice cover are making the NSR increasingly accessible to shipping, promising a significant reduction in travel distances and times between East Asia and Europe[1]. For China, a major trading power, this opportunity is of strategic importance: the route through the Arctic reduces the route from Chinese ports to Europe by 40-50 % compared to the traditional route through the Suez Canal, saving time and transportation costs[2]. In addition, the Arctic route avoids global shipping bottlenecks (such as the Strait of Malacca) and geopolitically tense regions, improving the reliability and safety of transportation[3].

Over the past decade, China has significantly increased its interest and activity in the Arctic. Even though China is not an Arctic state, the changes taking place in the region directly affect its climatic conditions and economic interests[4]. Understanding the importance of the NSR, China has developed a political and legal strategy for its use based on respect for international law, cooperation with Arctic States, and integration of the Arctic into its own development initiatives. This paper examines the international legal framework of the NSR regime and the PRC’s policy aimed at its development, with a particular focus on China’s goals in the light of existing international treaties and agreements.

China formalized its Arctic doctrine in the White Paper «China’s Arctic Policy» (2018), where it declared itself a «close state to the Arctic» and indicated its intention to participate in the development of the Arctic in a peaceful and legal way. China emphasizes that it does not make territorial claims in the Arctic and does not pursue an aggressive Arctic policy, without violating either conventional or contractual norms of international law. Instead, Beijing seeks to integrate itself into the existing Arctic governance system, promote common interests and «build a community of common destiny for humanity in the Arctic», while simultaneously ensuring its own legitimate rights and interests in the region[5].

International legal regime of the NSR

The Northern Sea Route as a route passes through several sea areas of different status – the internal waters and territorial sea of Russia, its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), as well as the Arctic Straits. The NSR navigation regime is regulated by several international instruments, primarily the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). According to UNCLOS, coastal States have sovereign rights in their internal waters and territorial sea, and within a 200-mile EEZ they have jurisdiction to protect natural resources and the marine environment. At the same time, all States enjoy freedom of navigation on the high seas and EEZs, as well as the right of peaceful passage through the territorial sea of foreign States[6]. A special regime is provided for international straits: if a waterway connects two parts of the high seas (or an EEZ), foreign ships and aircraft have the right to transit and pass through such a strait without obstacles from coastal States (Articles 37-38 of the Convention).

Regarding the Arctic, the key question is whether routes along the coasts of Russia and Canada are considered «straits used for international navigation», which are subject to the right of transit passage. This issue is the subject of a long-standing dispute. Thus, Russia and Canada insistюthat the North-East Passage (the Russian sector of the NSR) and the North-West Passage (the Canadian Arctic Archipelago) неare not international straits, since historically they were not used for world navigation[7]. Russia considers the NSR water area as a historically developed national transport communication[8]. Federal Law of the Russian Federation No. 132-FZ of July 28, 2012, explicitly defines the NSR as a «historically formed unified national transport line of the Russian Federation «that is open to foreign vessels if they comply with Russian navigation rules[9]. Russia drew straight baselines around its Arctic archipelagos, resulting in several straits (for example, Dmitry Laptev, Vilkitsky, etc.) being included in the internal waters of the USSR, and then the Russian Federation. Accordingly, transit navigation on them without a permit is not allowed – foreign vessels are required to request permission in advance from the NSR Administration, comply with the requirements for ice piloting, icebreaking wiring, etc. established by Russian regulations[10].

The United States and some other States challenge this legal position. They argue that the Arctic straits meet the geographical criterion of an international strait (connecting parts of the high seas) and have at least potential navigational significance and therefore should fall under the regime of freedom of transit passage. From their point of view, the requirement to obtain permits and attract icebreakers for passage contradicts the principle of freedom of navigation. The United States, which has historically defended maximum freedom of navigation in all regions of the world, has been particularly consistent in insisting on this. Washington qualifies restrictions on navigation on the NSR as excessive maritime claims and refuses to recognize them, occasionally conducting «freedom of navigation» operations in Arctic waters[11].

To justify its special regime on the NSR, Russia refers, in addition to its historical rights, to article 234 of UNCLOS – the so-called «Arctic exception». This article gives coastal States the right to enact and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations regarding the prevention of pollution from ships in areas covered with ice for most of the year within the EEZ[12]. The norm appeared during the development of the Convention at the initiative of Canada after the incident with the tanker «Manhattan» and is designed to consider the vulnerability of the polar seas. Russia and Canada interpret Article 234 as a legal basis for strict control of navigation on their Arctic routes to protect the fragile Arctic ecological system. On this basis, Russia requires all vessels on the NSR to comply with special Rules for navigation in the NSR water area (first adopted in 1990, updated in 2013 and 2020), including the need to obtain a permit, compliance with the ship’s ice class, payment for icebreaker services and pilotage, etc.[13]comply with Article 234, if they apply equally to all vessels (non-discriminatory) and are dictated by the special conditions of the Arctic seas. However, foreign experts point out the ambiguity of the wording of Article 234 and argue whether it makes it possible to set anyе restrictionsя or only in the context of environmental measures (for example, requirements for the design of ships, as in the IMO Polar Code). In any case, the legal status of the NSR de jure remains a subject of debate, although de facto most states and shipping companies recognize Russia’s leading role on this route and follow the rules established by it.

It should be noted that China, despite its interest in freedom of navigation, officially recognizes the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the Arctic states within their Arctic Sea areas. In particular, the PRC respects Russia’s legislative, executive, and judicial authority over the NSR when it is exercised within the framework of international law[14]. Chinese experts have repeatedly stated that China, not being an Arctic state, cannot make any territorial claims in the region, but has the right «to fully defend its rights to participate in Arctic affairs, including freedom of navigation and scientific research, based on international maritime law, led by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.» and use of the seabed». Thus, China takes a balanced position: while recognizing the special rights of coastal Arctic countries, Beijing simultaneously emphasizes the importance of universal norms (such as freedom of the high seas and transit passage) and the importance of taking them into account when regulating navigation in the Arctic[15].

International agreements and acts adopted with the participation of Arctic States and other interested parties have become an additional element of the NSR legal regime. One of the most important is the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (IMO Polar Code, 2014-2015), which establishes mandatory requirements for the design of ships, equipment, crew training and environmental safety of navigation in polar regions. China has actively participated in the development of the Polar Code through the International Maritime Organization and fully follows[16]it. The PRC has also joined several multilateral agreements affecting the Arctic, such as the 2018 Agreement on Measures to Prevent Unregulated Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean, which reflects China’s desire to act in the legal field and in the field of protecting the Arctic environment. Finally, since 2013, China has been an observer in the Arctic Council – the leading forum of Arctic States that has concluded important agreements (search and rescue 2011, oil spill response 2013). Although China is not a party to these agreements, its presence in the Council demonstrates its acceptance of the existing institutional system of Arctic governance. In general, the international legal framework for China’s Arctic policy is a combination of reliance on universal conventions (primarily UNCLOS), respect for bilateral agreements and national regimes of Arctic countries, and participation in soft law and institutions such as the Arctic Council[17].

China’s Arctic and Northern Sea Route policy

China’s Arctic policy has taken shape relatively recently, but it is developing rapidly. By the early 2010s, increased scientific and economic interest prompted Beijing to establish itself as an active participant in Arctic affairs. In May 2013, China was granted permanent observer status in the Arctic Council, officially recognizing the sovereignty of the Arctic States and the Council’s key role in regional governance. This step demonstrated to the international community China’s willingness to act in the Arctic within the existing rules. At the same time, China began to formulate its own strategy: in government documents, it was called the «Near-Arctic State» (Near-Arctic State), emphasizing China’s geographical proximity to the Polar latitudes and interest in Arctic processes.

This culminated in the publication in January 2018 of the White Paper «China’s Arctic Policy», the first comprehensive doctrinal document of the People’s Republic of China on Arctic issues. In this White Paper, China has clearly outlined its goals and principles in the region. Key objectives include understanding the Arctic (through scientific research), protecting its ecosystem, exploring and developing it (including resources and sea lanes), and participating in Arctic governance. The strategic objective is to «understand, protect, develop and participate in the management of the Arctic in order to ensure the common interests of all countries and the international community», while respecting the sustainable development of the region. China has declared its commitment to multilateral cooperation and the existing international legal framework, including the UN Charter, the Convention on the Law of the Sea, climate and environmental agreements, and the norms of the International Maritime Organization. As a fundamental principle, China declares respect for the sovereignty and sovereign rights of the Arctic countries, calling for mutual respect and consideration of the interests of all parties. The White Paper separately emphasizes that China does not seek militarization or control over the Arctic and acts as a «constructive participant» in the development and application of Arctic rules[18].

As for the Northern Sea Route, China’s policy is pragmatic and cooperative. The Chinese White Paper notes that the Arctic Ocean and Arctic routes are of great importance to China’s economy as a major trade and energy power. China explicitly recognizes the NSR as one of the three main Arctic shipping routes (along with the Northwest Passage and the Central Transpolar Route). The document declares that the development of Arctic Sea routes should be carried out in accordance with treaties (including UNCLOS) and general international law, while guaranteeing freedom of navigation for all countries in accordance with the law. At the same time, China «respects the legislative, executive and judicial rights of the Arctic states in the waters under their jurisdiction, «which implies recognition of Russia’s legal competence on the NSR route. In case of disputes over the status or regime of Arctic routes, China calls for resolving them based on international law[19].

The most important concept introduced by Beijing in the Arctic agenda is «Ледовый (Полярный) Шелковый путь»the «Ice Silk Road» (Polar Silk Road). It is an Arctic extension of the Global Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), linking Arctic communications with the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt and the maritime Silk Road of the 21st Century. For the first time, the idea to include the Arctic in the BRI was voiced around 2017. In June 2017, the State Development and Reform Committee of the People’s Republic of China, together with the State Oceanic Administration, published a document entitled «Vision of Maritime Cooperation within the framework of the Belt and Road», where they mentioned cooperation with Arctic countries in the development of navigation[20]. At the highest level, the topic was fixed in July 2017, when President Xi Jinping and Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev agreed on the joint development of the Polar Silk Road. Finally, the 2018 White Paper officially announced China’s commitment to » work with all parties to build the Polar Silk Road through the development of Arctic Sea routes.» This means integrating the Northern Sea Route into China’s infrastructure and trade plans. From Beijing’s point of view, the Northern Sea Route is a key part of the Polar Silk Road, which is also enshrined in doctrinal sources. China encourages its companies to participate in the construction of infrastructure along the route, conduct «commercial trial flights» and gradually switch to regular commercial shipping on the NSR, while strictly complying with the laws. Moreover, the focus is on the safety of navigation: China invests in Arctic hydrographic research, weather data collection, development of communication systems and search and rescue, as well as carefully studying the experience of navigation in high latitudes. The Chinese maritime authorities have already prepared navigation guides for navigation on the NSR – in 2014, a detailed «Guide to Navigation on the Northern Sea Route» was published in Chinese, which became the first such publication outside of Russia. It contains information about maps, ice, ports, wiring requirements, and legal regulations of the route, designed to help Chinese captains safely navigate a new route. A little later, China issued similar guidelines for the Northwest Passage in the Canadian sector, demonstrating a long-term interest in all Arctic routes[21].

Thus, there is a dual approach in China’s policy: on the one hand, China is integrating the development of the NSR into the global strategy «One Belt, One Road», considering the Arctic route as a new «blue economic highway» between Asia and Europe. On the other hand, Beijing tries not to oppose its plans to the interests of Russia and other Arctic countries but rather relies on partnership and mutually beneficial cooperation. Official documents emphasize the principle of «joint consultation, joint construction and joint winning» when implementing projects in the Arctic. This is reflected in the rhetoric: China talks about» sharing the opportunities «of the NSR,» coordinating development strategies «and creating a» global infrastructure network » with the participation of Arctic states.

Russian-Chinese cooperation on the NSR

Russia is a key partner of China in the development of the Northern Sea Route. Without the consent and support of Moscow, the implementation of the «Polar Silk Road» is impossible, given the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation over most of the route. Relations between the two powers in the Arctic sphere in recent years have been characterized by deepening coordination, although they are not without hidden contradictions. The convergence of positions is largely driven by geopolitical factors: both Russia and China are under pressure from the United States, are interested in creating alternative trade routes and developing the North, and complement each other – Russian resources and routes, Chinese capital and markets[22].

At the highest level, the joint development of the NSR is enshrined in several bilateral statements. In July 2017, at the leaders’ meeting in Moscow, the parties announced their intention to jointly create the Polar Silk Road and integrate the Eurasian Economic Union and the Belt and Road initiative, considering the Arctic direction. In subsequent Russian Chinese communiques, this topic was also raised, for example, in June 2019, the Joint Statement on the development of a Comprehensive Partnership spoke about deepening cooperation in the Arctic, and in 2025 about increasing cargo transportation along the NSR[23]. A significant practical step was the creation of a working group on the Arctic within the framework of the Russian-Chinese Cooperation Commission and a number of agreements between relevant departments (the Ministry of Eastern Development of the Russian Federation and the State Committee for Development and Reform of the People’s Republic of China, etc.) on cooperation in the development of the North[24].

Economic cooperation is fundamental: China is already investing heavily in Russia’s Arctic projects. A significant example is the participation of Chinese companies in liquefied natural gas projects on the Yamal Peninsula. China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the Silk Road Foundation have jointly acquired a 29.9% stake in NOVATEK’s Yamal LNG project. The plant was successfully launched in 2017, and today a significant part of the LNG produced is sent to China via the NSR. Further, in the spring of 2019, Chinese investors (CNOOC and CNPC) entered the new Arctic LNG 2 project with a combined share of 20%. Thus, Beijing is investing in the basic infrastructure that will become a generator of cargo traffic along the NSR for years to come. In addition to LNG, China is showing interest in other resource initiatives, from field development to the construction of ports and logistics hubs in northern Russia. Negotiations are underway on the participation of Chinese companies in projects of the Belkomur railway and the deep-water port of Arkhangelsk, designed to improve the connection of the interior of the Russian Federation with the Arctic[25].

В сфере судоходстваCooperation is also planned in the field of shipping. China’s state-owned shipping corporation COSCO has been operating experimental flights via the NSR since 2013. The first commercial Chinese vessel, the container ship Yong Sheng, successfully passed through the NSR in August-September 2013 from Dalian to Rotterdam, reducing the transit time by about 15 days[26]. Since then, Chinese vessels have been transiting annually during the navigation season, carrying both containers and cargo (such as equipment, liquefied gas). All these voyages were carried out in strict accordance with Russian requirements – the vessels received permits from the NSR Administration, hired Russian pilots and, if necessary, were accompanied by icebreakers. The Russian side notes that Chinese companies strictly observe the Rules of navigation on the NSR and thereby demonstrate respect for the regime of the Russian Federation[27]. This creates an atmosphere of trust. In 2019, the Russian state-owned enterprise Atomflot (an operator of nuclear icebreakers) and the Chinese company China COSCO Shipping signed an agreement on cooperation in the use of the NSR, involving the coordination of navigation schedules and, possibly, the creation of a joint venture for Arctic transportation.

However, there are also difficult moments. At the end of 2017 Russia has amended its Merchant Shipping Code, establishing in Article 4 the exclusive right to transport hydrocarbons (oil, gas, gas condensate, coal) along the Northern Sea Route by vessels flying the Russian flag[28]. The law came into force in February 2018 and potentially restricts the capacity of foreign, including Chinese, tankers and gas carriers. Formally, this measure is aimed at supporting Russian shipbuilding and shipping, but Chinese analysts took it with caution, seeing a risk to the economic efficiency of their investments. Beijing has not officially protested the law, but at the expert level, it is noted that such restrictions (along with high tariffs for icebreaking services and pilotage) reduce the attractiveness of the NSR for Chinese businesses[29]. However, soon after the law was adopted, the Russian government granted a few exceptions: in particular, it allowed NOVATEK to attract a fleet of foreign (including Chinese) icebreaking gas carriers under the flag of their countries of registration to export LNG from Yamal. This showed Moscow’s flexibility and willingness to seek a compromise in the interests of projects involving Chinese capital.

Both sides are aware of the mutual benefits of cooperation. For Russia, attracting China means investment, technology and guaranteed demand for resources, which accelerates the development of the Arctic. For China, the partnership with Russia provides access to the Arctic route and resources on acceptable terms, as well as strengthens its role as a legitimate actor in the region. At the same time, China avoids confrontation on sensitive issues – for example, refrains from maintaining the American position on the legal status of the NSR, as it values strategic partnership with the Russian Federation. Instead, Beijing prefers a behind-the-scenes dialogue: Chinese diplomats and experts hold discussions with their Russian counterparts on simplifying procedures on the NSR, improving the safety and economic efficiency of the route. It is likely that as traffic increases, new bilateral agreements will be concluded regulating the practical aspects of using the NSR (on information exchange, rescue operations, environmental standards, etc.).

China’s NSR development activities

China has taken several concrete steps in recent years to form its national framework for working on the NSR. First, the scientific and technical presence of the PRC in the polar latitudes has increased. The Chinese icebreaking expedition program has been operating since the 1990s, and since the 2010s, China has regularly sent scientific expeditions to the Arctic Ocean on the Xuelong (Snow Dragon) vessels. In 2018, the first heavy icebreaker built in China, the Xuelong-2, was launched, which increased the country’s ability to navigate independently in the Arctic ice. In 2025, China conducted the largest Arctic expedition in its history and made history: for the first time, Chinese scientists made a manned deep-sea dive under the Arctic ice. Since 2004, the Chinese scientific station «Yellow River» (in the village of Nu-Alesund), created based on the Svalbard Treaty of 1920, which China joined in 1925, has been operating in Svalbard. Through this station and regular expeditions, China monitors the Arctic climate, ice and environmental conditions, collecting data that is important for safe navigation[30], among other things.

Secondly, a regulatory framework and institutional mechanisms have been created within China to support the Arctic direction. In 2018, in parallel with the release of the White Paper, a special unit was formed in the State Oceanic Administration of the People’s Republic of China responsible for Arctic affairs. National standards and instructions for polar navigation are being developed. The publication of the NSR Guidelines (2014) and the Northwest Passage Guidelines (2015) demonstrates the involvement of the Ministry of Transport and the Chinese Maritime Administration in preparing shipping companies to work in difficult Arctic conditions. Training sessions for crews, flight simulations on simulators, and cooperation with Russian port and icebreaking services are conducted. Chinese shipping companies are investing in the construction of icebreaking merchant ships of the Arc7–Arc9 class, which can independently overcome a significant thickness of ice. For example, together with Finnish and domestic shipyards, gas tankers were designed for the Yamal LNG project, capable of operating on the NSR all year round.

Third, the commercial use of the NSR by Chinese companies is gradually expanding. If in the early 2010s these were single test flights, then by the middle of the decade a trend of regular summer navigation was formed. According to available data, in 2017-2019, COSCO vessels made at least a dozen transit flights on the China – Europe route via the NSR. China also receives cargo via the northern route: for example, the first shipments of LNG from Yamal to East Asia went directly through the Bering Strait in 2018, reaching the Chinese port of Jiangsu. In 2021-2022, despite the pandemic, traffic continued. Although the volume of traffic between China and Europe via the NSR is still small (hundreds of thousands of tons, which is insignificant compared to the Suez Canal), Chinese experts predict its growth as the ice situation and infrastructure improve. Chinese shippers are showing interest in the route for goods that are sensitive to delivery times (for example, electronics, which can reach Europe almost a week faster in the summer). Some companies are considering creating hubs at both ends of the NSR – in Murmansk and the Far East — to consolidate cargo and transfer it to ice vessels. In 2025, 23 flights were carried out via the NSR, showing an increase of 60% compared to previous years[31].

It should be noted that China approaches the development of the NSR in a balanced manner, considering environmental risks and the interests of indigenous peoples. The White Paper of the People’s Republic of China declares its commitment to protecting the Arctic environment and respecting the culture of the indigenous peoples of the North. China, for example, entered into an agreement in 2016 to establish an international marine reserve in the central Arctic Ocean, becoming one of the guarantors of a moratorium on commercial fishing there for the coming years. In addition, Chinese companies try to comply with high environmental standards: new ice vessels are built with reinforced double hulls, use liquefied natural gas as fuel to reduce emissions. Chinese experts are involved in research on the impact of shipping on Arctic ecosystems, collaborating with Russian and Western scientists. All this serves the same purpose – to fit Chinese activity into the framework of sustainable and legitimate development of the Arctic, to allay fears of a «threat from the East».

Problems and prospects

Despite the obvious success of China in shaping its Arctic policy, there are still problematic issues that can affect the future use of the NSR. First, the geopolitical situation: the deterioration of relations between Russia and Western countries after 2022 led to the fact that some Western companies and cargo left the NSR. This may slow down the development of the route and reduce its attractiveness for China in the short term. On the other hand, increasing sanctions pressure on Russia pushes it to focus even more on China as the main partner in the Arctic. Beijing is in a winning position, receiving preferential terms for resources and projects, but at the same time it must balance itself so as not to disrupt its own relations with Europe and not fall under secondary sanctions.

Second, there are economic and technical challenges. The commercial feasibility of transit along the NSR is still controversial: seasonal limitations (2-4 months of full navigation now), unpredictable ice conditions, the requirement for icebreaker escorts, and relatively small capacity-all this hinders many shipping companies. Chinese analysts explicitly point out that without significant infrastructure improvements and cost reductions, the NSR will not be able to compete with the Suez Canal for mass cargo flows. It is necessary to invest in a satellite communication system at high latitudes, the construction of emergency rescue centers and ports along the route. Russia has already announced plans for the development of the NSR until 2035, including the construction of new icebreakers, port facilities and the introduction of digital navigation. China is ready to help – for example, Chinese banks and funds can participate in the financing of Tiksi or Pevek ports, supply equipment. However, there may be disagreements on the terms of investment and project control. In addition, China’s own icebreaking fleet is still limited to ensure a year – round presence-a second icebreaker is being built, ice cargo ships are planned, but this is in the initial stage.

Third, legal nuances and international pressure. The presence of non-Arctic powers in the Arctic (including China) is increasingly viewed in the United States and NATO through a security lens. So, in 2019, the United States publicly announced China’s» aggressive actions » in the Arctic, implying its investments and possible military use of infrastructure. China is forced to refute these suspicions, emphasizing the peaceful nature of its initiatives. However, it cannot be ruled out that if the PRC’s influence in high latitudes continues to grow, Western countries will try to limit it – politically or through new norms (for example, an environmental protection regime that will hinder industrial activity)[32]. It is important for China to continue its policy of transparency and multilateralism to legitimize its presence. One way is China’s initiative to conclude new international agreements for the Arctic – for example, China supports the idea of developing a binding agreement on fisheries management in the Central Arctic, suggests strengthening cooperation in the field of communications (laying underwater cables, satellite coverage) and joint climate research. Engaging in the multilateral arena will help China present itself as a responsible power interested in order, not unilateral expansion[33].

Finally, a new factor appears on the horizon – the potential of the Central Arctic Route through the Polar Basin, outside the territorial waters of coastal states. Some forecasts indicate that by the middle of the 21st century, seasonal ice reduction may open transit directly across the North Pole. In the 2018 White Paper, China also mentions this «Central Route» along with the NSR and NWF. If the central route ever becomes truly navigable, it could provide China with a direct route to Europe, bypassing Russian control. Of course, this is a long-term prospect, but it is already considered by analysts. So, Chinese experts note that the United States and Russia have geographical advantages for controlling the entrances to the Arctic (the Bering Strait, the Northwest Passage), which creates certain risks of dependence for China. In the future, China is likely to seek to diversify Arctic routes, supporting scientific research and possibly new international regimes for the Central Arctic. However, so far, the Northern Sea Route remains the most realistic and developing route, and China’s focus will be on working with Russia to optimize[34]it.

Conclusion

China’s policy and legal position on the Northern Sea Route demonstrate a balanced approach: China seeks to take advantage of the economic and strategic advantages of the Arctic route, while playing by the rules and respecting the interests of coastal States. The PRC has established a solid conceptual framework-from establishing the status of a «near-Arctic state» to including the Arctic in the agenda of the «One Belt, One Road» initiative-which allows it to legitimately increase its presence in the region. At the normative level, China relies on universal international treaties (primarily the Convention on the Law of the Sea) and subscribes to relevant agreements, confirming its commitment to international law. When implementing its plans, whether it is scientific expeditions, trade flights or investment in projects on the NSR, Beijing acts through cooperation. The example of the Russian-Chinese partnership in the Arctic shows that China is ready to consider Russia’s national sovereignty, preferring to negotiate special conditions rather than engage in confrontation.

At the same time, China clearly states that as a non – Arctic State, it has legitimate rights in the Arctic-freedom of navigation, scientific research, and participation in the development of the resources of the open sea and the ocean floor. China intends to exercise these rights without going beyond the existing norms. This position is understood: the international legal discourse notes that the PRC does not violate either conventional or treaty norms in its Arctic aspirations. On the contrary, Chinese activity can contribute to the development of legal regimes — by supporting new agreements (on fisheries, ecology, etc.) and requirements for the safety of navigation (the same Polar Code).

The prospects for China’s participation in the use of the NSR largely depend on the evolution of its relations with Russia and other Arctic countries. At this stage, the cooperative scenario looks solid: mutual interest in the development of the Polar Silk Road and Arctic resources pushes Moscow and Beijing to compromise and joint projects. If the parties continue to follow the «win-win» logic, the Northern Sea Route can turn into a busy trade artery, bringing benefits to both China (in the form of reduced transportation time and costs, access to resources) and Russia (in the form of investment and cargo flow). More broadly, China’s participation means the internationalization of the Arctic economy, which is likely to encourage the development of international legal frameworks for new activities (for example, regulating Arctic tourism, laying underwater communications, etc., where China is also interested).

To sum up, the legal and political framework of the PRC in relation to the NSR is characterized by the desire to integrate its global economic project with the Arctic region, while respecting the norms of international law and coordinating with the Arctic states. China is shaping the image of a responsible participant in Arctic affairs, promoting the idea of «common destiny» and mutual benefit. This strategy has already borne its first fruits – China has established itself in the Arctic as a permanent observer of the Arctic Council, as a major investor and trading partner, and its ships regularly plow the waters of the Arctic Ocean. There are certainly risks and difficulties ahead, but Beijing’s course of legal integrity and diplomatic cooperation creates a solid foundation for China’s continued participation in the use of the Northern Sea Route in the interests of both its own and the international community.

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[1] Moe A. China and Arctic Shipping: Policies, Interests and Engagement. 2019; doi:10.24411/2618-6888-2019-10015

[2] 冰上丝绸之路”——浅谈我国对北极开发享有的权利 | 北京金诚同达律师事务所 // An electronic resource. Access mode [URL]: https://www.jtn.com/CN/booksdetail.aspx?type=06001&keyid=00000000000000003331&PageUrl=majorbook&Lan=CN (date of request 10.12.2025).

[3] See, ibid.

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[5] Kienko, Elena Viktorovna. «International Legal Foundations of China’s Cooperation with the Arctic States» Journal of Foreign Legislation and Comparative Law, No. 2, 2019, p. 65.

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[10] See more details, Russian International Affairs Council. // An electronic resource. Access mode [URL]: https://russiancouncil.ru/en/northernsearoute/ (date of request 10.12.2025).

[11] Todorov Andrey Andreevich. «The legal dispute between Russia and the United States on the Northern Sea Route and a similar issue on the North-Western Sea Route» Arctic and North, No. 29, 2017, p. 79.

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[15] Ng C.Y., Wu Y., Zhang W., Jigeer S., Zhang J., Yu H. (2024) China-Russia Cooperation in the Northern Sea Route Development. International Organisations Research Journal, vol. 20, no 1, p. 50.

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[17] Kienko, Elena Viktorovna. «International Legal Foundations of China’s Cooperation with the Arctic States» Journal of Foreign Legislation and Comparative Law, No. 2, 2019, p. 67.

[18] China’s Arctic Policy. The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. January 2018 // An electronic resource. Access mode [URL]: https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm (date of request 10.12.2025).

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[25] See more details, Elizabeth Wishnick. Sino-Russian Consolidation at a Time of Geopolitical Rivalry, 2020 // Access mode [URL}: file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/Elizabeth%20Wishnick%20CLM%20Issue%2063%20March%202020.pdf (date of request 10.12.2025).

[26] Zhao Lei. China to release its first guidebook on Arctic shipping shortcut. // Access mode [URL]: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-06/20/content_17602584.htm (date of request 10.12.2025).

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[28] Article 4 of the Code of Merchant Shipping of the Russian Federation dated 30.04.1999 N 81-FZ (as amended on 06/24/2025). // Consultant plus. Access mode [URL]: https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_22916/34f75acf2137e658bde4c7924a1306b5de57f427/ (date of request 10.12.2025).

[29] Elizabeth Wishnick. Sino-Russian Consolidation at a Time of Geopolitical Rivalry, 2020 // Access mode [URL}: file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/Elizabeth%20Wishnick%20CLM%20Issue%2063%20March%202020.pdf (date of request 10.12.2025).

[30] Tripathi, I., & Bindra, S. (2024). CHINA’S NEAR-ARCTIC STATE AMBITIONS AND OVERLAP WITH PACIFIC MARITIME DEFENCE: BLIND SPOTS FOR THE U.S. AND INDIA. ShodhKosh: Journal of Visual and Performing Arts, 5(6), 3389–3399. https://doi.org/10.29121/shodhkosh.v5.i6.2024.6317

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[32] Biedermann R. China’s impact on the European Union’s Arctic policy: critical junctures, crossovers, and geographic shifts. Asia Eur J. 2021;19(4): p. 472. doi: 10.1007/s10308-021-00605-7. Epub 2021 May 29. PMID: 34093101; PMCID: PMC8163586.

[33] 文章引用: 王钰凤. 国际法框架下的中国北极政策研究[J]. 争议解决, 2024, 10(4): p. 368. DOI: 10.12677/ds.2024.104240

[34] Ng C.Y., Wu Y., Zhang W., Jigeer S., Zhang J., Yu H. (2024) China-Russia Cooperation in the Northern Sea Route Development. International Organisations Research Journal, vol. 20, no 1, pp. 72.

Информация об авторе:
Ма Боцзяэр, аспирант кафедры международного права, РУДН


Information about the author:
Ma Bojiaer, phd student, Department of International law, RUDN University