Международный правовой курьер

В перечне ВАК с 2015 г.

International legal and national mechanisms promoting a green energy transition

The global energy landscape is undergoing a profound transformation under the threat of climate change and the depletion of fossil resources. The transition to «green» energy, i.e. to sustainable and low-carbon energy sources, has become a necessary condition for ensuring environmental safety and sustainable development. Energy is a major source of greenhouse gas emissions, so decarbonizing this area is a key element of global efforts to curb the growth of the Earth’s average temperature. Awareness of the scale of the problem has led the international community to develop international legal mechanisms designed to facilitate and accelerate the green energy transition.

International law in the field of combating climate change has formed a set of agreements, obligations and institutions aimed at reducing emissions, promoting renewable energy and transferring environmentally friendly technologies. A new architecture of global energy governance is being formed, in which international legal mechanisms play a central role in coordinating the actions of States. This article analyzes the main international legal mechanisms that facilitate the transition to green energy, as well as examines the contribution and approaches of key actors — China, Russia, the United States and Europe – to the implementation of these mechanisms.

Global contractual and legal mechanisms of climate and energy policy

The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) laid the foundation for international cooperation by establishing the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities of States. In accordance with this principle, all countries recognize a common responsibility to combat climate change, but the scope of their obligations is differentiated by the level of socio-economic development and historical contribution to the problem[1]. This principle of equity has formed the basis of all subsequent agreements: developed countries have taken the lead and pledged to support developing countries, both financially and technologically[2].

The 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC was the first binding treaty to set quantitative targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions for industrialized countries. To achieve these goals, the protocol introduced innovative mechanisms that stimulated green projects. A key one was the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which allowed countries with emission reduction commitments to invest in projects to reduce emissions in developing countries (such as building solar power plants or implementing energy-efficient technologies) and receive emission credits for doing so[3]. The CDM has become the first global carbon credit market and an important channel for attracting investment in renewable energy, combining the goals of reducing emissions with the goal of sustainable development. Through this mechanism, more than 1,650 projects were registered by 2012 and over 2.9 billion tons of CO₂ equivalent of reduced emissions were generated[4], a significant part of which came from renewable energy projects. Thus, the Kyoto Protocol paved the way for the use of market-based instruments and the transfer of clean technologies for the energy transition.

The 2015 Paris Agreement marked a turnaround in global climate efforts and the formation of a long-term energy transformation strategy. For the first time, almost all countries of the world have joined the legally binding agreement (at the time of its entry into force in 2016 – 175 countries, including the largest issuers). The Paris Agreement sets out an ambitious goal: to keep the global average temperature rise well below 2 degrees Celsius and make efforts to limit warming by one and a half degrees Celsius relative to pre-industrial levels[5]. To achieve this goal, all participating States have committed themselves to prepare and implement nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to reduce emissions, followed by regular updating of these contributions every 5 years, with increasing ambition. This mechanism of «incremental commitments» is designed to ensure the dynamics of the energy transition: each new update of the goals should be more ambitious than the previous one, reflecting the maximum possible efforts of the country[6].

The Paris Agreement is universal and differentiated: it applies to all countries, but recognizes differences in their circumstances and capabilities. The text explicitly states that States have a common but differentiated responsibility, considering their different capabilities and national circumstances. Developed countries are required by the agreement to provide financial assistance to developing countries to implement their climate actions. The financial component was framed as a collective commitment to mobilize US $ 100 billion annually by 2020-2025 for projects to reduce emissions and adapt to vulnerable countries. A gradual increase in this support is envisaged, and the most advanced developing countries are also encouraged to voluntarily contribute to poorer countries[7]. In addition to funding, developed countries have an obligation to promote technology transfer and capacity-building in countries at a lower level of development. For this purpose, the Paris Agreement has established a Technological and capacity-building mechanism based on the UNFCCC institutions. The agreement also provides transparency – a unified system of monitoring and reporting on the implementation of commitments has been introduced, with some flexibility for the least developed countries[8].

Unlike the strict quotas of the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement is more flexible and relies on voluntary goals of countries, which considers their national characteristics. However, its universality and regular review of commitments create a sustainable legal space for strengthening clean energy transition measures. It can be said that the Paris Agreement consolidated at the international legal level the long-term trajectory of the global energy transition in the form of turna to a new low-carbon development model based on the gradual abandonment of fossil resources in favor of green technologies.

In addition to the framework climate agreements, sectoral and cross-sectoral international initiatives play an important role. In 2015, the UN Sustainable Development Goals were adopted, one of which (SDG 7) explicitly calls for universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy sources, which includes scaling up renewable energy[9]. International organizations and partnerships have been established to support the energy transition: for example, in 2009, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) was established, which now unites more than 160 countries and promotes the exchange of best practices, policy analysis and attraction of investments in renewable energy[10]. At the COP26 conference (Glasgow, 2021), the EU and US initiated the launch of the Global Methane Memorandum, which was joined by more than 100 countries that pledged to reduce methane emissions by 30% by 2030[11]. At COP28 (Dubai, 2023), world leaders agreed for the first time on a collective goal to triple the world’s renewable energy capacity by 2030 to keep the warming trajectory within one and a half degrees Celsius[12]. The main political and legal outcome of COP30 was the adoption of the so-called Global Mutirao solution, which established a new integrated architectural approach to climate action, but without an explicit commitment to phase out fossil fuels. The Global Mutirao decision confirms the goals of the Paris Agreement and the need for rapid emission reductions, while strengthening the role of the multilateral regime and the principles of equity and «just transition». The document sets out guidelines for increasing climate finance (including losses and damage) and updating the NDC, but the term «phasing out fossil fuels» was never included in the text, which became the main subject of criticism[13]. These political and legal initiatives complement the contractual framework, encouraging states to take concrete measures in the electric power industry, oil and gas sector, etc.

Finally, the evolution of international law is also reflected in related areas – such as trade and investment agreements. The rules of the World Trade Organization affect the support of renewable energy (remember the disputes about «green» subsidies and localization of equipment production)[14]. Investment contracts are also adjusted to meet climate goals: for example, the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty, which has long protected the interests of fossil energy investors, has faced criticism as an obstacle to climate policy (foreign companies have used its mechanisms to sue states that impose restrictions on hydrocarbon production). In 2022-2024, a number of major European economies (the EU, Germany, France, Spain, Poland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, etc.) announced their withdrawal from the Treaty or its non-application to intra-union relations, considering that even the upgraded version does not meet the goals of the Paris Agreement on decarbonization. This demonstrates the willingness of States to reform international legal regimes outside the framework of environmental agreements in order to remove legal barriers to the energy transition[15].

Thus, a multi-layered set of regulatory and institutional mechanisms has emerged at the global level to encourage countries to move towards clean energy. Climate treaties provide strategic goals and commitments, cooperative mechanisms (finance, technology, carbon markets) mitigate the transition burden for the poorest countries, and new initiatives and reforms of international trade and investment rules are designed to align the global economy with the goals of a green transition. In the following sections, we will look at how these mechanisms are implemented and supplemented using the example of the largest participants in international relations – the European Union, China, the United States, and Russia.

European mechanisms

The European Union has traditionally been a leader in global climate policy and energy transition. Back in 2015, when signing the Paris Agreement, the EU announced its intention to completely rebuild its energy sector on low-carbon rails by the middle of the XXI century. In 2019, EU leaders officially approved the goal to achieve climate neutrality by 2050, that is, to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions to zero[16]. This goal is enshrined in the European Green Deal, a strategic transformation plan for the EU economy announced by the European Commission in December 2019.[17] A key element of the Green Deal was the adoption of the European Climate Law (2021), which made legally binding the goal of zero net emissions by 2050 for the entire European Union[18]. The EU has also raised its interim emissions reduction target for 2030 to -55% from 1990 levels (previously the target threshold was -40%)[19], which requires an accelerated transition to renewable energy sources, energy efficiency and the introduction of clean technologies in all sectors of the economy.

For the practical implementation of these goals, the EU has an extensive system of regulations and economic mechanisms. A series of directives have been adopted to promote renewable energy, the latest of which (Directive (EC) 2018/2001) set a target of 32% of the share of renewable energy in energy consumption by 2030 (in 2023, this figure will be increased to 42.5%, considering new climate ambitions). The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is the world’s largest carbon market, introducing fees for power plants, factories and aviation, and encouraging the transition to clean technologies. The European Investment Bank has stopped financing fossil fuel projects and is investing heavily in renewable energy projects. The package of measures supports innovation: the EU invests in the development of hydrogen energy, energy storage, smart grids, etc. In addition to internal transformation, the European Green Deal strategy includes an external dimension: it declares the EU’s desire to «work on the international stage to raise standards around the world» and use its diplomatic and economic power to accelerate the global green transition[20].

European countries actively support environmentally oriented cooperation with other countries and make the largest contribution to international funds. The EU and its member States are the largest source of public climate finance in the world, collectively providing around 23 billion euros in 2021 for emissions reduction and adaptation in developing countries. Through the Green Climate Fund, sustainable development funds, and bilateral technical assistance programs, Europe finances solar and wind energy projects, power grid modernization, and energy efficiency improvements in a number of countries in Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe. The EU has also co-initiated a number of international agreements aimed at reducing the use of coal and methane, and joined the Powering Past Coal Alliance)[21].

We should also mention such a legal innovation as the Carbon Import Regulation Mechanism (CBAM), approved by the EU in 2023 – the world’s first cross-border carbon tax. Starting in 2026, it will be gradually levied on importers of carbon-intensive goods in the EU in order to prevent «carbon leakage» and encourage lower emissions in partner countries. Although the introduction of CBAM raises controversy over compliance with WTO rules, the EU positions it as a measure that complements the Paris Agreement and encourages others to follow the course of decarbonization.

The revision of investment agreements was an important illustration of how Europe links international law to climate goals. As mentioned, the European Union and most of its members decided to withdraw from the Energy Charter Treaty due to its non-compliance with the goals of the energy transition. At the same time, the EU promotes the inclusion of chapters on climate and sustainable energy in new trade agreements (for example, with Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom) and requires partners to commit to the Paris Agreement. This proactive approach has been dubbed «Green Deal internationalization» – the EU seeks to extend its high environmental standards and decarbonisation goals beyond the Union’s borders, using the tools of «soft power» (diplomacy, financing, technology exchange) and «hard power» (legal requirements in trade and economic transactions)[22].

In sum, Europe has become the world’s testing ground for legal measures for the transition to green energy and the most important donor and partner for developing countries on this path. The European experience shows that the consistent strengthening of international legal mechanisms (from voluntary agreements to strict EU law) can not only transform the domestic energy sector, but also give impetus to global changes towards sustainable energy.

China’s approach and international legal assistance with Chinese characteristics

Today, the People’s Republic of China plays a dual but crucial role in the global green transition: as the larges producer and consumer of energy, China has simultaneously become a world leader in the pace of renewable energy development and a key player in international climate negotiations. China ratified the UNFCCC (1993) and the Kyoto Protocol (as a developing country, it had no mandatory quotas), and in 2016 it was one of the first countries to ratify the Paris Agreement. At the same time, China insistently defends the principles of the sovereign right to development and justice in negotiations, demanding that developed countries respect the doctrine of common but differentiated obligations. It was at the insistence of China and the group of developing countries that the Paris Agreement took into account the principles of equity and «different national circumstances», as well as the voluntary nature of climate contributions for developing countries[23]. The joint declaration of the leaders of the United States and China (November 2021) confirmed the understanding that China’s efforts will «increase as much as possible» after 2030, given the still ongoing industrialization[24].

China’s own commitments under the Paris Agreement are quite extensive. Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2020 announced at the UN General Assembly national goals: to reach the peak of co₂ emissions no later than 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. These goals were officially recorded in the updated National Contribution of the People’s Republic of China and became a reference point for internal reforms. In 2021, China introduced the concept of «ecological civilization» into the Communist Party Constitution, emphasizing the strategic priority of green development. In August 2022, the Climate Change Law of the People’s Republic of China came into force, creating the basis for planning low-carbon development, and the national quota trading system (ETS) covering the energy sector is in operation. Thus, China has begun to build a domestic legal framework that is consistent with its international obligations[25].

In the international arena, China emphasizes its commitment to multilateralism and reliance on the UN legal framework. In the speeches of the Chinese leadership, the thesis that the UN Framework Convention and the Paris Agreement are the basis of international climate cooperation is always voiced, and obligations must be strictly observed.» The Chinese side insists that developed countries should keep their promises on financing and technology transfer by supporting emerging economies in their green transition. Thus, the White Paper «China’s Energy Transition (2024) notes that China» will work together with all countries to adhere to the principle of justice and common but differentiated responsibilities, implement the goals of the Paris Agreement, and form a fair and mutually beneficial global climate management system. Developed countries should provide developing countries with funding, technology and capacity-building to help them meet the twin challenges of energy security and a green, low-carbon transition» [26]. This position of the PRC, which reflects the interests of the global South, is reflected in the decisions of the BRICS, G77 and China forums, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization-where China promotes the agenda of a just and comprehensive energy transition.

No less significant is China’s concrete contribution to the practical promotion of green energy in the world. China has become the largest producer and exporter of renewable energy technologies – solar panels, wind turbines, and components for electric vehicles. According to the International Energy Agency, China accounted for about 60% of the global growth in renewable energy capacity in 2023. China not only meets domestic needs (building solar and wind power plants at record rates), but also actively helps other countries to increase clean energy. As noted by the head of the IEA F. Birol, «China is developing renewable energy on a large scale at home and at the same time providing services and support to other countries, significantly increasing the availability of clean energy technologies and reducing their global cost.» Chinese companies are involved in the construction of renewable energy projects around the world, from solar parks in Latin America to hydroelectric power plants in Southeast Asia and wind farms in Central Asia. The Belt and Road Initiative has launched Green Investment partnership programs aimed at financing sustainable energy in the participating countries. In 2021, China announced that it would stop building coal-fired power plants abroad, switching investment to clean sources. In addition, China, together with France and the United Nations, has initiated the creation of a Global Advanced Climate Technology Center that will help developing countries develop renewable energy and energy storage systems[27].

The trends of recent years are encouraging: the increase in energy consumption is mainly covered by renewable energy sources, strict energy efficiency standards are being introduced, and a green financing program is being launched. International law serves as a guide and external incentive for China – the implementation of the Paris commitments is seen as an image and geopolitical factor. It is no coincidence that the text of the Chinese White Paper «Energy Transition» emphasizes that China actively promotes global energy transition, participates in the formation of international rules and is ready to «make a Chinese contribution» to the common cause. This reflects Beijing’s vision of a «community of one destiny for humanity»: countries should work together to achieve a green, inclusive and sustainable future based on UN principles.

In summary, China combines domestic measures for environmental modernization of the energy sector with an active position in international institutions. International legal mechanisms – from the Paris Agreement to the bilateral Green Belt and Road agreements – are used by the PRC as a tool for attracting resources and technologies, as well as for exporting its own successful experience in the field of renewable energy. The Chinese case demonstrates that for developing economies, international law acts not only as a limit on emissions, but also as a channel for access to finance and technology necessary for a green energy breakthrough.

United States policy and renewed climate leadership

The United States of America, with its largest economy and historically significant carbon footprint, has taken different positions on the global energy transition in different periods. The United States signed the Kyoto Protocol, but never ratified it, and for many years federal climate policy stalled. It was only in 2015 that the Obama administration took an active role in shaping the Paris Agreement, which was largely influenced by US-China strategic cooperation (the 2014 joint Statement set the tone for the comprehensive agreement). The Paris Agreement, although it did not require Senate ratification (it was framed as an executive agreement), soon faced a political reversion: in 2017, President D. Trump announced the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, jeopardizing multilateral efforts. Formally, the withdrawal came into force on November 4, 2020, and the United States became the only country that retreated from its Paris commitments[28].

However, this retreat was temporary. The change of administration led to a sharp course correction: on January 20, 2021, on his first day in office, President Joe Biden signed a decree on the return of the United States to the Paris Agreement. Already on February 19, 2021, the United States officially became a party to the agreement again, demonstrating its commitment to international climate law. President Biden has announced that a comeback is just the beginning: «America will once again lead the global fight against the climate crisis.» Indeed, the United States has stepped up its diplomatic efforts: in April 2021, a virtual Climate leadership conference was convened, where the United States announced an updated national contribution — reducing emissions by 50-52% by 2030 from 2005 levels and achieving carbon neutrality by 2050. These goals fit into the logic of the Paris Agreement and encouraged other countries to increase their ambitions. In addition, the United States has increased funding: in 2021, it pledged to double the amount of climate assistance to developing countries to $11.4 billion a year by 2024.[29]

The US administration has also initiated new international formats to promote the green transition. In 2021, the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF), an informal platform that brings together ~20 countries with the largest emissions, will resume its work to coordinate actions outside the UN framework. On the sidelines of the COP26 conference, the United States and the EU announced a Global Methane Agreement, as noted earlier, which has already been supported by 150 countries. Washington has also launched decarbonisation partnerships with individual countries (for example, the Clean Energy Transition Agreement with Vietnam, similar agreements with South Africa and India – which provide financial and technical assistance to move away from coal). As part of the G7 and G20, the US has promoted initiatives to phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies and develop green infrastructure. It is noteworthy that the United States, which has long stayed away from IRENA, applied for membership in this organization in 2022, signaling its readiness to integrate into global renewable energy institutions.

Domestically, the United States has taken radical measures that, although not internationally legal, are of global significance: in August 2022, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) was adopted, providing for a record $369 billion in investments in clean energy and incentives for the production of renewable technologies. This law is estimated to allow the United States to significantly reduce emissions by 2030 and increase the availability of advanced green technologies (such as hydrogen, batteries) on the global market. European and Asian partners, however, criticized some of the protectionist provisions of the IRA (benefits for products produced in the United States), seeing a violation of WTO principles, but in general this measure is perceived as a serious contribution of the United States to the global energy transition[30].

It should be noted that the international legal obligations of the United States on climate change are still based on executive acts and subject to fluctuations in the political pendulum. A possible change of administration in 2025 once again raises questions about the long – term course-there have already been statements about the potential re-withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement. Nevertheless, there is a growing involvement of the United States in multilateral mechanisms: American diplomacy has been involved in developing the rules of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement (international carbon markets), joined the Leading Declaration on Forests and Land Use (Glasgow, 2021), supported the creation of a damage recovery fund for vulnerable countries (COP27 decision).

In general, the role of the United States in the international legal mechanisms of the green transition can be described as a return to leadership: from a symbolic step of re – accession-to real influence through funding, technology and political involvement. The United States seeks to use its scientific and technological superiority (for example, through the Mission of Innovation Initiative, which promotes breakthrough energy technologies) and allied blocs (for example, the US-EU Council on Technology and Trade discusses the harmonization of «green» standards) to accelerate the global energy transition. At the same time, the variability of US domestic policy points to the problem of the reliability of international legal regimes that depend on the political environment: The Paris Agreement was originally built on voluntary contributions, and the US case demonstrated the vulnerability of this approach. A possible solution is to make climate commitments more stringent – for example, through their implementation in national legislation (as the EU does) or the development of mechanisms of international responsibility. However, for now, the United States ‘ return to the Paris Agreement regime and its active climate diplomacy have significantly strengthened multilateral efforts for a green energy transition.

Russian Federation: from passivity to forming a long-term strategy.

Russia’s participation in international legal mechanisms of green energy transition has its own specifics, due to the structure of its economy and energy sector. Russia joined the UNFCCC in 1994 and played a key role in the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, ratifying it in 2004. Under Kyoto, Russia did not have a reduction commitment (its target value coincided with the 1990 level), which actually allowed it to accumulate excess quotas due to the economic downturn of the 1990s. However, Russia has participated in Kyoto mechanisms-especially in quota trading and Joint Implementation projects-by selling excess units to other countries. This resulted in some financial resources for the modernization of energy efficiency, although the scale of the impact on the energy sector was limited.

The Paris Agreement initially met with a cautious reaction in Russia. The country signed it in 2016, but delayed ratification for several years. Only in September 2019, the Russian Government issued Decree No. 1228-r on Russia’s acceptance of the Paris Agreement, registering its accession by a government act (bypassing ratification by the parliament). This decision had an important political and legal significance: Russia reaffirmed its commitment to global climate goals, while emphasizing some reservations. The resolution noted that Russia proceeds from the need to consider the absorbing capacity of Russian forests in the implementation of the agreement, as well as the inadmissibility of using climate measures as a barrier to the development of countries. At the same time, it was stated that Russia will not allow its right to economic growth to be infringed – the green transition should not become an obstacle to development, especially given the investment capacity of decarbonization tasks. These reservations reflect a position close to developing countries, although Russia formally belongs to the group of developed economies[31].

By becoming a party to the Paris Agreement, Russia has formulated its national goals. The First Contribution of the Russian Federation (NDC) set a goal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 30% by 2030 from 1990 levels, considering forest absorption. This goal did not require drastic efforts (by 2015, Russian emissions were already at about -30% by 1990, thanks to the economic changes of the 90s and the effect of forest absorption). Therefore, the international community assessed the contribution of the Russian Federation as insufficiently ambitious. Russia argued its position with a special structure of the economy and its role as a major supplier of hydrocarbons. However, the Paris Agreement spurred the start of strategic planning for the transition. In 2020, the Presidential decree approved the «Strategy of Environmental Safety until 2025», and in October 2021-the «Strategy of Environmental safety until 2025»[32]. The Government approved the Strategy of socio-economic development of the Russian Federation with a low level of greenhouse gas emissions until 2050[33]. For the first time, this policy document sets out the goal of achieving carbon neutrality by 2060 at the latest and provides scenarios for decarbonizing the economy. The target intensive scenario of the strategy assumes active modernization and technological re-equipment, as a result of which by 2050 gross emissions will be reduced by 910 million tons, and absorption will increase by 665 million tons due to forests and soils. Net greenhouse gas emissions should decrease by 60% from the level of 2019 (and by 80% from the level of 1990), which will create conditions for achieving full carbon neutrality by 2060. The strategy directly links Russian policy to the global energy transition, stating that its goal is «to adapt the Russian economy to the global energy transition, which is critical for export-oriented sectors,» while reducing emissions. The Russian leadership emphasizes that the transition should take place gradually and consider national interests, so as not to limit economic growth, but on the contrary – to ensure its sustainability on a new technological basis[34].

At the international level, Russia supports climate agreements, but often takes a conservative position when specifying them. In the negotiations, the Russian Federation consistently advocates for recognizing the contribution of forests and other natural sinks to achieving the Goals (which is important for Russia with its vast forest areas). The Russian delegation often emphasizes the principle of technological neutrality – the need to develop various low-carbon technologies (including peaceful atom, carbon capture), and not just renewable sources. Russia participates in a number of voluntary initiatives: for example, it joined the Agreement on Forests (COP26) on ending deforestation by 2030; it is a member of the International Energy Agency and joined IRENA in 2022, hoping to exchange best practices. At the same time, Russia refrained from signing the Methane Memorandum and a number of coal-abandonment coalitions, citing its national circumstances (the contribution of methane from the Russian Federation is relatively small, and the share of coal in the energy sector, although declining, remains significant in some regions).

The Russian initiative on voluntary certification and trade in carbon units on Sakhalin Island, designed to work out mechanisms for achieving carbon neutrality at the regional level by 2025, has become notable. This experiment, although internal, is being conducted in conjunction with international experts and can become a model for implementing Article 6 of the Paris Agreement (international carbon mechanisms) in Russia. In addition, Russia is promoting the idea of mutual recognition of carbon units with the EAEU and other partners – we are talking about creating a common carbon market in the Eurasian Economic Union, as indicated in the EAEU strategies. While these plans are still in the early stages, they show that Russia is looking for its place in the global low-carbon architecture, relying on regional integration[35].

It should be noted that the geopolitical events of 2022-2023 (the crisis around Ukraine, sanctions, and the severance of a number of economic ties with the West) affected the context of Russian climate actions. On the one hand, there were difficulties in accessing advanced green technologies and financing, and increased internal pressure to preserve the extraction and export of fossil fuels. On the other hand, the embargo and reorientation of export flows encourage Russia to develop new areas – for example, to increase the supply of nuclear reactors, hydrogen technologies and equipment for renewable energy to Asian markets. Russia declares its intention to occupy a niche as an exporter of «low-carbon energy carriers – — primarily hydrogen (including «green» from renewable energy sources and «blue» from natural gas with carbon dioxide capture). In 2023, Russia, China and Mongolia agreed on a joint project «Asia-super Grid» – the export of Russian low-carbon electricity to Asian countries, which can contribute to the regional energy transition. Although these plans are still far from being implemented, they show that international legal obligations (such as the Paris Agreement) and economic changes are encouraging Russia to gradually turn towards green energy.

In general, Russia entered the green transition agenda relatively late, but the existence of an international legal framework stimulated the formation of a long-term strategy and goals for decarbonization. The Russian government officially recognizes the need for «structural adjustment of the economy for the global energy transition» and confirms its commitment to the goals of the Paris Agreement. In practical terms, Russia relies on a gradual reduction in carbon intensity (through energy efficiency, gasification, nuclear power, localization of production of renewable energy equipment) and on maintaining the competitiveness of its energy export industries in the face of stricter international climate standards. International law is viewed rather as an external reality that needs to be adapted to minimize risks to the economy, but at the same time, Russia declares its readiness to participate in the formation of new rules (for example, it has proposed its own methodology for accounting for forest absorption for consideration by the UNFCCC). Thus, international legal mechanisms serve as both an incentive and a constraint for Russia: they have prompted the development of a national low-carbon strategy, but they require taking into account Russian interests, which the country tries to ensure by actively participating in negotiations and using the reservations allowed by agreements.

Conclusion

The analysis shows that international legal mechanisms play a fundamental role in facilitating and accelerating the global transition to green energy. On the basis of multilateral treaties-the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement-a framework of long-term goals and commitments aimed at decarbonizing the global energy sector has been created. This framework is complemented by a system of financial, technological and institutional instruments that enable countries to jointly address the challenges of the energy transition. International law provides countries with a platform for cooperation: it sets common benchmarks (for example, warming limits of one and a half to two degrees Celsius), encourages the exchange of best practices and technological solutions, and provides a mechanism for solidarity support for less developed countries in their movement towards clean energy.

Of course, significant challenges remain. Despite significant progress made through international agreements, national policies, and market mechanisms, the world is still not on track to meet the Paris Agreement goals – collectively, the stated efforts are insufficient to limit warming by one and a half degrees Celsius. Geopolitical tensions add to the complexity, which can hinder collective action and undermine trust between countries. In addition, the legal nature of the current regime (voluntary NDC, no direct sanctions for non-compliance) means that success depends on the political will of States. The example of fluctuations in US policy clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of the system to internal changes in the exchange rate.

Nevertheless, international law has a dynamic development. The mechanisms for periodic review of commitments laid down in the Paris Agreement are already leading many countries to update their goals in the direction of increasing ambitions. New arrangements are being created – for example, COP27 established a financial support mechanism for countries affected by climate disasters (Loss and Damage funds), which will increase the confidence of developing countries. In 2023, at COP28, the international community made a historic decision to step up its efforts on renewable energy – reaching about 11 of renewable generation capacity by 2030 (3 times the current level). This demonstrates the countries ‘ willingness to jointly accelerate the energy transition.

Further improvement of legal mechanisms requires the harmonization of approaches and elimination of legal gaps. It is necessary to integrate the goals of green transition into global trade rules (consolidate the legitimacy of carbon regulation measures, encourage the exchange of green goods and services), reform investment agreements, eliminate the protection of obsolete carbon-intensive assets, and develop norms that encourage cross-border clean energy projects. Assistance to developing countries remains crucial: as China and other G77 countries have pointed out, without real support, the poorest countries will not be able to switch to green energy without compromising development. This requires new legal solutions, perhaps the creation of specialized agreements on technology transfer or on a «green marshall plan» for financing energy transfer.

In conclusion, we can state that international law has already become one of the key factors facilitating (facilitating) the global green energy transition. It has set common goals, mobilized resources, and united countries to tackle the unprecedented challenge of reorienting the world’s energy sector to a sustainable path of development. The examples of the EU, China, the United States, and Russia show different models of participation in these mechanisms, but all of them are more or less aimed at the same goal. Further strengthening of international legal mechanisms — through increased ambition, legal commitment and enhanced cooperation-will create a fairer and more effective framework for achieving carbon neutrality by the middle of the twenty-first century and ensuring human prosperity while maintaining climate stability.

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  9. Precious Oluwaseun Okedele, Onoriode Reginald Aziza, Portia Oduro, & Akinwale Omowumi Ishola. Global legal frameworks for an equitable energy transition: Balancing growth and justice in developing economies. // International Journal of Applied Research in Social Sciences. Volume 6, Issue 12, P. 2878-2891, December 2024 DOI: 10.51594/ijarss.v6i12.1765
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  11.  Fatih Birol. China’s Green Technologies Boost Global Energy Transition // Access mode: electronic resource [URL]: https://www.qstheory.cn/qshyjx/2024-03/12/c_1130088344.htm (date of request 12.12.2025).

[1] The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992 // Official website. Access mode: electronic resource [URL]: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/convention_text_with_annexes_english_for_posting.pdf (date of request 12.12.2025).

[2] The 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC // Official website. Access mode: electronic resource [URL]: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/cop3/l07a01.pdf (date of request 12.12.2025).

[3] The Clean Development Mechanism // Official website РКИК ООН. Access mode: electronic resource [URL]: https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-kyoto-protocol/mechanisms-under-the-kyoto-protocol/the-clean-development-mechanism (date of request 12.12.2025).

[4] See, ibid.

[5] The 2015 Paris Agreement // Official website. Access mode: electronic resource [URL]: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf (date of request 12.12.2025).

[6] COP21: The key points of the Paris Agreement — Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs // Official website The French Government. Access mode: electronic resource [URL]: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/climate-and-environment/the-fight-against-climate-change/2015-paris-climate-conference-cop21/cop21-the-paris-agreement-in-four-key-points/ (date of request 12.12.2025).

[7] Precious Oluwaseun Okedele, Onoriode Reginald Aziza, Portia Oduro, & Akinwale Omowumi Ishola. Global legal frameworks for an equitable energy transition: Balancing growth and justice in developing economies. // International Journal of Applied Research in Social Sciences. Volume 6, Issue 12, P. 2882, December 2024 DOI: 10.51594/ijarss.v6i12.1765

[8] Abduvokhidov M.Y. LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR PROMOTING TRADE IN RENEWABLE ENERGY AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL // Universum: Economics and Jurisprudence : electron. scientific Journal 2024.11(121). URL: https://7universum.com/ru/economy/archive/item/18447

[9] SDG 7. // Official website of SDG. Access mode: electronic resource [URL]: https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal7 (date of request 12.12.2025).

[10] IRENA official website. // Access mode: electronic resource [URL]: https://www.irena.org/ (date of request 12.12.2025).

[11] COP26: Together for our planet. // Official website. Access mode: electronic resource [URL]: https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/cop26 (date of request 12.12.2025).

[12] COP28 Tripling Renewable Capacity Pledge – Analysis – IEA // Official website. Access mode: electronic resource [URL]: https://www.iea.org/reports/cop28-tripling-renewable-capacity-pledge (date of request 12.12.2025).

[13] COP30: landmark outcomes emerge from negotiations despite unprecedented geopolitical tensions. // Official website. Access mode: electronic resource [URL]: https://cop30.br/pt-br (date of request 12.12.2025).

[14] See more details, Asmelash, H 2023, ‘The Role of International Trade Law in the Energy Transition’, The Journal of World Investment & Trade, vol. 24, no. 6, pp. 847–859. https://doi.org/10.1163/22119000-12340312

[15] See more details, Lobonț, O.R.; Bărbulescu, M.A.; Criste, C.; Ran, T.; Moldovan, N.C. Paying the Price to Power the Future: Environmental Taxation, Energy Transition, and Europe’s Green Deal. Energies 2025, 18, 5902. https://doi.org/10.3390/en18225902

[16] 5 facts about the EU’s goal of climate neutrality. // Official website ЕС. Access mode: electronic resource [URL]: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/5-facts-eu-climate-neutrality/ (date of request 12.12.2025).

[17] European Green Deal. // SECCA official website. Access mode: electronic resource [URL]: https://secca.eu/en/knowledge-hub/eu-policies-and-regulations/green-deal/ (date of request 12.12.2025).

[18] Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of the EU 2021/1119 of June 30, 2021 on the establishment of a legal framework for achieving climate neutrality and on amendments to Regulations 401/2009 and 2018/1999. // The Garant System. Access mode: electronic resource [URL]: https://base.garant.ru/406269597/ (date of request 12.12.2025).

[19] 5 facts about the EU’s goal of climate neutrality. // Official website ЕС. Access mode: electronic resource [URL]: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/5-facts-eu-climate-neutrality/ (date of request 12.12.2025).

[20] Sikora A. European Green Deal – legal and financial challenges of the climate change. ERA Forum. 2021;21(4):687. doi: 10.1007/s12027-020-00637-3.

[21] Milyukova M.A. Renewable energy sources: international legal mechanisms of cooperation between the EU Member States. Moscow Journal of International Law.2022;(3):73. https://doi.org/10.24833/0869-0049-2022-3-68-88

[22] Lobonț, O.R.; Bărbulescu, M.A.; Criste, C.; Ran, T.; Moldovan, N.C. Paying the Price to Power the Future: Environmental Taxation, Energy Transition, and Europe’s Green Deal. Energies 2025, 18, 5902. https://doi.org/10.3390/en18225902

[23] Gbomagba, M. (2025) Role of Law Driving Energy Transitions: A Critical View from China and Selected African Countries. Beijing Law Review, 16, 86-88. doi: 10.4236/blr.2025.161005.

[24] See more details Glasgow Statement on Strengthening Climate Action. // Access mode: electronic resource [URL]: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma3_auv_2_cover%20decision.pdf (date of request 12.12.2025).

[25] China releases its first Energy Law. // IKI official website. Access mode: electronic resource [URL]: https://climatecooperation.cn/climate/china-releases-its-first-energy-law/ (date of request 12.12.2025).

[26] Full text: China’s Energy Transition // The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China August 2024. // Official website of the State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. Access mode: electronic resource [URL]: http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/zfbps_2279/202408/P020240829582914597985.pdf (date of request 12.12.2025).

[27] Fatih Birol. China’s Green Technologies Boost Global Energy Transition // Access mode: electronic resource [URL]: https://www.qstheory.cn/qshyjx/2024-03/12/c_1130088344.htm (date of request 12.12.2025).

[28] Bang G. The United States: conditions for accelerating decarbonisation in a politically divided country. Int Environ Agreem. 2021;21(1):51. doi: 10.1007/s10784-021-09530-x.

[29] Munachi Chikodili Ugwu & Adefolake Olachi Adewusi. NAVIGATING LEGAL AND POLICY CHALLENGES IN THE ENERGY TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES FROM THE UNITED STATES AND NIGERIA. // International Journal of Applied Research in Social Sciences P-ISSN: 2706-9176, E-ISSN: 2706-9184 Volume 6, Issue 4, P.No. 511, April 2024, DOI: 10.51594/ijarss.v6i4.988.

[30] China is appealing the Law on reducing US inflation. // Official website of the WTO Expert Center. Access mode: electronic resource [URL]: https://wto.ru/our-blog/kitay-obzhaluet-zakon-o-snizhenii-inflyatsii-ssha/ (дата обращения (12.12.2025).

[31] See more details, Milyukova M.A. International Legal Content of the Concept «Renewable Energy Sources» Revisited. Journal of Law and Administration. 2024;20(1):120-135. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.24833/2073-8420-2024-1-70-120-135

[32] DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF the RUSSIAN FEDERATION On the Strategy of Environmental Safety of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2025. // Electronic fund of legal and regulatory-technical documents. Access mode: electronic resource [URL]: https://docs.cntd.ru/document/420396664 (date of request 12.12.2025).

[33] GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION DECREE No. 3052-r dated October 29, 2021 On the Strategy for the Socio-Economic Development of the Russian Federation with Low Greenhouse Gas Emissions until 2050. // Electronic fund of legal and regulatory-technical documents. Access mode: electronic resource [URL]: https://docs.cntd.ru/document/726639341 (date of request 12.12.2025).

[34] See more details, The Arctic today: the strategy for low-carbon socio—economic development of Russia until 2050 has been approved — PORA — Arctic Development Project Office. // Access mode: electronic resource [URL]: https://porarctic.ru/ru/comments/arktika-segodnya-utverzhdena-strategiya-nizkouglerodnogo-sotsialno-ekonomicheskogo-razvitiya-rossii-/ (date of request 12.12.2025).

[35] Eurasian integration through the carbon agenda is a new vector for the EAEU. // Official website of the WTO Expert Center. Access mode: electronic resource [URL]: https://wto.ru/our-blog/evraziyskaya-integratsiya-cherez-uglerodnuyu-povestku-novyy-vektor-dlya-eaes/ (дата обращения (12.12.2025).


Информация об авторе:

Фанфэй Цзинь, аспирант кафедры международного права РУДН

Information about the author:

Fangfei Jin, PhD student, Department of International law, RUDN University

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