The Northern Sea Route is often described either as a Russian national transport corridor or as an emerging international waterway. Neither description is sufficient. The route crosses maritime spaces subject to different legal regimes, while navigation is administered through an integrated Russian system of permits, reporting, routing, ice services, and technical requirements. China’s growing interest in Arctic shipping adds another layer to this already complex legal setting.
This article examines how the law of the sea, IMO instruments, Russian regulation, Chinese maritime law, and bilateral cooperation interact in governing Chinese use of the route. It argues that the legality of the NSR regime cannot be assessed through a single characterization of the route. Individual requirements must instead be examined by reference to the maritime zone in which they operate, their regulatory purpose, and their effect on navigation.
Particular attention is given to Article 234 of UNCLOS, the Polar Code, Russia’s navigation regime, and China’s responsibilities as a flag and user state. The article identifies persistent difficulties concerning the changing geographical scope of ice-covered-area jurisdiction, the relationship between international and national standards, cumulative compliance burdens, environmental risks not fully addressed by the Polar Code, and the limited development of Arctic-specific obligations for Chinese operators.
A durable framework would combine uniform IMO standards with scientifically justified Russian supplementary measures, more specific Chinese flag-state and corporate obligations, and a bilateral operational arrangement that preserves the parties’ legal positions. The central issue is therefore not whether the NSR should be “nationalized” or “internationalized,” but whether coastal-state regulation can be made sufficiently transparent, evidence-based, non-discriminatory, and responsive to changing Arctic conditions.
Keywords: Northern Sea Route; China; Polar Silk Road; UNCLOS Article 234; Polar Code; Arctic shipping; Russian legislation; marine environmental protection.
Между контролем прибрежного государства и свободой судоходства: использование Китаем Северного морского пути
Особое внимание уделяется статье 234 Конвенции ООН по морскому праву, Полярному кодексу, российскому режиму судоходства и обязанностям Китая как государства флага и пользователя. В статье выявляются сохраняющиеся трудности, связанные с изменением географической сферы юрисдикции в отношении ледовых районов, взаимосвязью между международными и национальными стандартами, кумулятивным бременем соблюдения требований, экологическими рисками, не в полной мере учтенными в Полярном кодексе, и ограниченным развитием специфических для Арктики обязательств для китайских операторов.
Устойчивая рамочная структура должна сочетать единые стандарты ИМО с научно обоснованными российскими дополнительными мерами, более конкретными обязательствами китайского государства флага и корпораций, а также двусторонним оперативным соглашением, сохраняющим правовые позиции сторон. Таким образом, центральный вопрос заключается не в том, следует ли «национализировать» или «интернационализировать» Северный морской путь, а в том, можно ли сделать регулирование прибрежных государств достаточно прозрачным, основанным на фактических данных, недискриминационным и отвечающим меняющимся условиям Арктики.
Ключевые слова: Северный морской путь; Китай; Полярный шелковый путь; статья 234 Конвенции ООН по морскому праву; Полярный кодекс; арктическое судоходство; российское законодательство; защита морской среды.
1.Introduction
Discussion of Arctic shipping usually begins with geography: shorter distances between Asia and Europe, retreating sea ice, new resource projects, and the strategic importance of northern transport corridors. Those considerations explain the growing interest in the Northern Sea Route, but they do not resolve its legal character. The NSR is not a single maritime zone, nor does international law assign one uniform navigation regime to every part of it.
Russian legislation defines and administers the NSR as a historically established national transport communication. The statutory route, however, passes through or alongside waters that may include internal waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, and the exclusive economic zone. Different legal consequences follow in each case. Innocent passage, freedom of navigation, coastal-state environmental jurisdiction, and the law governing straits used for international navigation cannot be collapsed into a single rule merely because Russia operates a unified permit and navigation system.
This distinction is especially important for China. China is not an Arctic coastal state and has no jurisdiction over the route by virtue of geography. Its legal interests arise from other capacities: it may act as a flag state, trading state, investor, shipowner, charterer, cargo owner, scientific partner, and participant in IMO rulemaking. Chinese vessels rely in practice on Russian hydrographic information, ice forecasts, ports, icebreaker assistance, emergency services, and administrative decisions. At the same time, China has a legitimate interest in ensuring that restrictions on navigation remain connected to a recognized jurisdictional basis and are applied predictably and without discrimination.
The resulting relationship is neither purely bilateral nor purely international. A Russian authorization may be indispensable for a particular voyage, but it does not displace China’s flag-state obligations. A Polar Ship Certificate establishes an internationally recognized technical baseline, but it does not necessarily answer every route-specific risk. Political support for the Polar Silk Road may facilitate projects and infrastructure, yet it creates no independent navigation entitlement. Each legal layer performs a different function, and much of the controversy arises when one layer is treated as if it could replace the others.
Article 234 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea lies at the centre of this debate. It grants coastal states unusual authority to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory pollution-control measures in ice-covered areas where severe climatic conditions create exceptional hazards and pollution could cause major ecological harm. The provision responds to the vulnerability of polar navigation, but it is neither territorially unlimited nor detached from the interests of navigation. Its reference to due regard and the best available scientific evidence becomes increasingly important as ice conditions vary across seasons and along different parts of the route.
The mandatory IMO Polar Code has altered the regulatory context without eliminating the role of coastal states. It supplies common rules on ship design, equipment, operations, training, certification, and pollution prevention. At the same time, it leaves a number of environmental and operational risks only partly addressed. The difficult question is therefore not whether international or national regulation should prevail in the abstract. It is when, and on what evidence, Russia may impose requirements additional to internationally accepted standards.
This article approaches that question through doctrinal and comparative legal analysis. Treaty provisions are interpreted in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; Russian and Chinese legislation is examined alongside IMO instruments and scholarship published in English, Russian, and Chinese. The analysis proceeds measure by measure. For any restriction imposed on foreign navigation, it asks which maritime zone is involved, what rule supplies jurisdiction, what regulatory purpose is pursued, and whether the burden placed on navigation remains connected to that purpose.
The article argues for a layered model of regulation. UNCLOS allocates jurisdiction and navigation rights. IMO instruments establish common technical standards. Russia may adopt supplementary measures where the applicable maritime regime permits them and where present risks justify their use. China, in turn, should give more concrete legal content to its responsibilities as a flag state and as the home state of enterprises participating in Arctic shipping. Bilateral cooperation can connect those layers through data exchange, emergency planning, certificate recognition, and transparent procedures without requiring either state to abandon its legal position on maritime zones or navigation rights.
This approach does not eliminate disagreement over the NSR. It does, however, shift the debate away from competing labels and towards the legality, purpose, and practical operation of particular measures.
2. The NSR as a Legally Plural Maritime Corridor
Article 234 of UNCLOS is the normative center of the debate. It permits coastal states to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory pollution-control laws in ice-covered areas within the exclusive economic zone when severe climatic conditions and ice covering the area for most of the year create exceptional navigational hazards and pollution could cause major harm or irreversible ecological disturbance[1]. The provision is exceptional because it authorizes unilateral coastal-state regulation beyond the ordinary balance established by Articles 56, 58, and 211. Yet its exceptional character also limits it. Article 234 is not a general delegation to regulate trade, collect revenue, select commercial partners, or transform the exclusive economic zone into territorial waters. The legal object is vessel-source pollution prevention, reduction, and control; navigational safety is relevant insofar as it is connected to that environmental object.
A good-faith interpretation must give effect to every element of the provision[2]. First, the measure must apply within the exclusive economic zone; authority in internal waters and the territorial sea rests on different provisions. Second, the environmental risk and ice conditions must exist in the regulated area rather than merely somewhere along the route. Third, the rules must be non-discriminatory. Fourth, they must have due regard to navigation and be based on the best available scientific evidence. These requirements support a spatially differentiated reading. If one sector remains severely ice-constrained while another is seasonally open and routinely navigable, an identical year-round burden across both sectors becomes harder to justify solely under Article 234.
Climate change does not automatically extinguish Article 234. The phrase “ice covering such areas for most of the year” is factual and dynamic but reduced average ice extent does not eliminate multi-year ice, drifting ice, pressure ridges, fog, remoteness, limited bathymetric data, or the severe consequences of an accident. Conversely, the provision cannot be frozen in the climatic conditions of 1982. Its application should be periodically reassessed through transparent ice, meteorological, hydrographic, traffic, and ecological data. The legally preferable response to climatic change is therefore not wholesale invalidation or indefinite preservation, but risk-based zoning and temporal calibration.
Outside Article 234, the applicable navigation regime depends on the legal character of the waters. Russia exercises sovereignty in internal waters and the territorial sea, subject in the latter to innocent passage. In the exclusive economic zone, foreign ships enjoy navigation freedoms subject to coastal-state rights and lawful environmental regulation. Waters enclosed by straight baselines may also be affected by Article 8(2), which preserves innocent passage where newly drawn baselines enclose areas not previously considered internal waters[3]. Accordingly, a single permit covering an entire voyage may be administratively coherent but cannot derive from one identical jurisdictional title at every point.
The status of individual straits remains contentious. The Corfu Channel judgment treated a strait’s geographical connection and its use for international navigation as relevant.[4] Some commentators therefore argue that increased foreign transit could strengthen claims to transit passage through Russian Arctic straits. Russian scholarship and official practice emphasize historical title, long-standing internal-water claims, the limited history of international navigation, and the special environmental circumstances of the region. A categorical answer for the entire NSR is methodologically unsound. The assessment must identify the specific strait, baseline, historical practice, physical alternatives, pattern of international use, and relationship between the strait and adjacent exclusive economic zones or high seas. The uncertainty itself is a regulatory problem: operators require predictable procedures even where states preserve opposing legal positions.
The IMO Polar Code supplies the global safety and environmental baseline. Made mandatory through SOLAS Chapter XIV and amendments to MARPOL, it regulates ship design, construction, equipment, operational limitations, voyage planning, crew training, pollution prevention, certification, and the Polar Water Operational Manual[5]. Its strength lies in uniformity and flag-state implementation. A vessel’s Polar Ship Certificate and operational assessment create a common technical language that is more readily integrated into classification, insurance, chartering, and port-state control than a collection of route-specific national rules.
The Code is not comprehensive. Its environmental provisions do not fully resolve black carbon, underwater noise, grey water, invasive species, or the cumulative effects of traffic. The MARPOL prohibition on heavy fuel oil in Arctic waters is an important addition, but exemptions and waivers delay uniform application for some ships until 2029[6]. Furthermore, the original safety scope excluded several categories of non-SOLAS vessels. Amendments effective from 1 January 2026 extend navigation and voyage-planning requirements to specified fishing vessels, pleasure yachts, and smaller cargo ships, demonstrating that the global regime is capable of incremental adaptation.[7]
The relationship between the Polar Code and Article 234 should be understood as minimum-plus rather than mutual exclusion. IMO standards establish internationally accepted minima. Article 234 may justify stricter, geographically specific measures where the statutory conditions are met. But the existence of a global technical standard raises the evidentiary burden for additional national requirements. Russia should be able to explain what route-specific risk is not adequately addressed by the Polar Code, why the supplementary rule is rationally connected to that risk, and why a less restrictive alternative would be insufficient.
3. Russian Regulation: Functional Integration and Its Legal Limits
The modern Russian regime was consolidated by the 2012 amendments to the Merchant Shipping Code and by the Rules of Navigation approved in 2020[8]. It combines voyage authorization with requirements concerning vessel particulars, ice class, time and route of navigation, icebreaker assistance, ice pilotage, reporting, insurance or other financial security, hydrometeorological support, and compliance with safety and environmental standards. Separate Ministry of Transport instruments regulate icebreaker assistance, route escort, and hydrometeorological services[9]. Institutionally, the regime relies on Rosatom’s role as NSR infrastructure operator and on the Northern Sea Route Administration for specified administrative functions.
This architecture has a rational functional basis. Arctic navigation requires coordination that ordinary coastal shipping does not: route selection must respond to rapidly changing ice; emergency assistance is distant; communications are incomplete; and a casualty may have consequences that cannot be remedied by conventional spill-response techniques. Russian and Chinese scholars have correctly observed that the post-2012 permit system is more predictable than the former assumption of mandatory icebreaker guiding for every foreign vessel and that it formally permits independent navigation where technical conditions allow.
Nevertheless, functional integration must not be confused with legal homogeneity. Requirements applied in the territorial sea may be justified by innocent-passage rules and coastal safety powers; requirements in the exclusive economic zone require a different jurisdictional basis. Fees for actual services are distinct from charges imposed merely for passage. A permit may operate as a single administrative interface, but the legal grounds for each condition should be identifiable. This distinction is essential not only for interstate legitimacy but also for judicial review, insurer assessment, and commercial planning.
The 2022 amendments concerning foreign warships and other non-commercial government vessels introduced a separate permission procedure for entry into internal waters within the NSR area[10]. From a doctrinal standpoint, this regime should be kept analytically separate from Chinese commercial utilization. Warships enjoy sovereign immunity, and the rules governing their passage engage security and sovereignty questions that are not identical to the pollution-control jurisdiction applicable to merchant vessels. Blurring the two categories risks turning an environmental and commercial shipping regime into a broader strategic-access controversy.
Russia’s Arctic policy documents define the NSR as a national development and security priority, and the governmental plan to 2035 links navigation to ports, icebreakers, satellites, emergency services, and resource projects[11]. Those legitimate strategic interests do not alter the allocation of maritime jurisdiction under UNCLOS. They do, however, explain why Russia is unlikely to accept an internationalized management authority. The realistic legal question is therefore how to discipline and coordinate national administration—not how to replace it with a regime for which neither treaty law nor regional political consent presently exists.
Russian legislation describes the NSR as a historically established national transport communication. The expression has political, historical, and administrative significance, but it cannot by itself determine the international legal status of every included water area. Russian scholarship itself recognizes that the route comprises legally different zones. Conversely, criticism of the phrase does not prove that the permit system is unlawful in its entirety. The proper inquiry is measure-specific: what is the relevant maritime zone, what rule authorizes the measure, what purpose is pursued, and how does the measure affect navigation?
This approach also clarifies the scholarly disagreement. Critics emphasize possible inconsistency between compulsory authorization, route limitations, or pilotage requirements and navigational freedoms. Defenders stress historical practice, internal-water claims, Article 234, and the exceptional vulnerability of the Arctic[12]. Both positions become overbroad when expressed at the level of the entire route. A permit condition may be valid in one segment and legally doubtful in another; compulsory assistance may be proportionate during severe ice conditions and unnecessary during an open-water window. Legitimacy is therefore better secured by published justification and periodic review than by reiterating an undifferentiated status formula.
4. China’s Utilization: Rights, Compliance, and Regulatory Gaps
China’s 2018 Arctic Policy is legally more balanced than some geopolitical summaries suggest. It describes China as a “near-Arctic State,” supports construction of a Polar Silk Road, and encourages Chinese enterprises to participate in infrastructure and commercial trial voyages. At the same time, it affirms respect for the sovereignty, sovereign rights, jurisdiction, laws, and regulations of Arctic states and commits China to UNCLOS, the Polar Code, and IMO rulemaking[13]. This duality is not necessarily contradictory. As a user state, China has an interest in navigation rights and uniform rules; as a state that strongly regulates navigation in waters under its own jurisdiction, it also recognizes significant coastal-state authority.
The 2017 Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative and the Fourteenth Five-Year Plan place the Arctic route within China’s broader connectivity policy[14]. Yet the Polar Silk Road is a policy framework, not a source of navigational entitlement. Chinese vessels obtain rights from the law of the sea and treaty law, and they incur obligations under flag-state law, Russian law where applicable, and private contracts. Policy language can stimulate investment, but it cannot settle disputed strait status, waive Russian permits, or create access to icebreaker services.
Chinese scholarship reflects this pragmatic position. Some authors emphasize that different Arctic routes and segments may possess different legal statuses rather than one uniform character. Others focus on legal risk, the need to comply with Russian procedures, and the importance of increasing China’s participation in international rulemaking. The most persuasive approach avoids both extremes: uncritical acceptance of every Russian claim would weaken China’s user-state interests, while an abstract insistence on freedom of navigation would fail to account for China’s operational dependence and its own coastal-state practice.
China possesses substantial general maritime legislation. The revised Maritime Traffic Safety Law requires seaworthiness, certification, qualified crews, safety management, reporting, emergency response, and pollution-prevention arrangements. The revised Marine Environment Protection Law applies mainly to sea areas under Chinese jurisdiction but also expresses prevention, source control, public participation, and polluter responsibility as central principles[15]. These statutes provide a legal foundation for supervising Chinese-flagged ships and maritime enterprises, but they are not tailored to Arctic navigation.
The gap is not the absence of all law; it is the absence of an integrated Arctic compliance instrument. China has no dedicated statute or binding administrative regulation that consolidates Polar Code compliance, Russian NSR procedures, ice-navigator competence, voyage-specific risk assessment, insurance, black-carbon mitigation, emergency planning, casualty disclosure, and environmental due diligence for Chinese operators. The 2018 White Paper requests lawful and responsible conduct, but policy expectations are less precise than enforceable operator duties[16].
This deficiency matters because flag-state responsibility cannot be outsourced to Russia. Russia may authorize a voyage and provide route services, but China remains responsible for effective jurisdiction and control over ships flying its flag. Chinese banks, state-owned enterprises, insurers, charterers, and cargo interests may also shape conduct more effectively than formal navigation rules alone. A credible Chinese Arctic regime should therefore regulate the entire decision chain: vessel selection, financing, chartering, crew qualification, routing, emissions, emergency preparedness, and post-incident reporting.
Russian-Chinese political documents increasingly support the use and development of the NSR, and the 2024 joint statement encourages enterprises of both states to deepen cooperation in shipping, logistics, and infrastructure[17]. Such statements are important evidence of institutional convergence, but they do not establish a condominium over the route or grant Chinese ships a privileged legal status. Preferential treatment based solely on nationality would also sit uneasily with Article 234’s non-discrimination requirement where a Russian measure relies on that provision.
The correct function of bilateralism is operational. China and Russia can exchange ice and hydrographic data, coordinate emergency exercises, recognize equivalent certificates, translate legal notices, standardize digital applications, and clarify commercial service terms without prejudicing their positions on baselines, straits, or navigation rights. The Arctic search-and-rescue, oil-pollution response, and scientific cooperation agreements show that regional law can organize practical cooperation without creating a comprehensive Arctic treaty[18]. China, although not a party to the first two agreements, can support their implementation through bilateral arrangements and IMO-compatible procedures.
5. Principal Regulatory Challenges
The first challenge is not simply strict regulation but opacity regarding its legal basis and cumulative effect. A Chinese operator must combine UNCLOS, SOLAS, MARPOL, the Polar Code, Russian navigation rules, service contracts, classification requirements, insurance warranties, sanctions screening, and Chinese flag-state law. Individually rational requirements may become duplicative or inconsistent when assembled. For example, a vessel may hold a valid Polar Ship Certificate yet still face route-specific ice-class, escort, or seasonal limitations. Such additional measures may be justified, but predictability requires an explanation of the residual risk they address.
A related problem is the concentration of administrative and commercial functions. Where an entity participates in route regulation, infrastructure planning, and the provision of paid icebreaker services, foreign operators may question neutrality, tariff formation, and the availability of review. This does not make the institutional arrangement unlawful, but it increases the need for published criteria, reasoned decisions, separated accounting, and an independent appeal mechanism. Regulatory legitimacy must be visible to the regulated party.
The second challenge is climatic dynamism. A rule adopted for perennial or near-perennial ice may become excessive during a prolonged open-water season, while the same sector may again present extreme hazards months later. Fixed geographical claims and static annual rules are therefore poorly matched to a provision whose factual predicates are spatial and temporal. The best available scientific evidence requirement should be treated as a continuing duty rather than a one-time legislative recital.
A defensible Russian system would publish annual and seasonal Article 234 maps identifying ice conditions, navigational hazards, ecological sensitivity, traffic patterns, and the specific supplementary measures applicable in each zone. Such maps would not surrender legal claims. They would demonstrate that exceptional jurisdiction is exercised because of present risk. They would also reduce the danger that climate-related weakening of one requirement is used to challenge the entire NSR regime.
The third challenge is the gap between accident prevention and ecosystem protection. The Polar Code is strongest on ship safety and conventional pollution categories; it is less complete on black carbon, underwater noise, grey water, wildlife disturbance, and cumulative impacts[19]. The heavy-fuel-oil rule is weakened by delayed application and waivers[20]. Increased navigation may therefore be formally compliant yet still impose significant climate and ecological costs. In the Arctic, where recovery is slow and response capacity limited, the precautionary principle supports action before damage becomes statistically routine[21].
Russian route rules and Chinese operator regulation should address these gaps in a coordinated manner. Possible measures include use of cleaner distillate or low-emission fuels, black-carbon management plans, speed and routing measures near sensitive habitats, restrictions on routine discharges beyond MARPOL minima, mandatory carriage of specialized spill-response equipment, and transparent emissions and incident reporting. National measures must remain consistent with treaty obligations; where broad international navigation is affected, Russia and China should pursue IMO adoption or endorsement rather than relying indefinitely on bilateral practice.
The fourth challenge is that legal permission does not create rescue capacity. Sparse ports, limited repair facilities, communications gaps, extreme weather, and long response distances can turn a manageable casualty elsewhere into a systemic Arctic event. OPRC and the Bunker Convention provide relevant global frameworks, but effective response depends on equipment, trained personnel, pre-positioned assets, and contractual clarity[22]. A Chinese voyage plan should therefore include identified places of refuge, emergency towing arrangements, pollution-response resources, medical evacuation options, and financial security adequate for Arctic costs.
Private law is equally important. Charterparties and carriage contracts should allocate risks of ice delay, route deviation, permit refusal, compulsory escort, changes in sanctions or insurance availability, salvage, general average, and environmental liability. The NSR’s distance advantage should not be equated with legal or commercial reliability[23]. A voyage may be shorter but more expensive or less predictable once ice class, escort, waiting time, insurance, and emergency contingencies are priced.
The fifth challenge is procedural legitimacy for communities exposed to risk. Arctic shipping affects subsistence activities, coastal infrastructure, food security, and culturally significant marine areas. UNDRIP supports participation and consultation where projects affect indigenous lands, territories, resources, and environmental conditions, while Russian law provides guarantees for indigenous small-numbered peoples[24]. Neither Russian Chinese strategic statements nor ordinary permit procedures presently provide a clearly visible, route-wide mechanism through which affected communities can review traffic plans, receive incident information, or influence mitigation measures.
Participation should not be treated as a symbolic addition. Local and indigenous knowledge can improve route planning, wildlife protection, seasonal restrictions, emergency response, and identification of places where even a low-probability accident would be socially catastrophic. A bilateral mechanism should therefore include permanent community representation, or, at minimum, structured consultation linked to environmental and infrastructure decisions.
6. Prospects: A Layered Regulatory Model
The most realistic prospect is a layered model with five distinct functions. First, UNCLOS allocates sovereignty, sovereign rights, jurisdiction, and navigational freedoms. Second, IMO instruments establish uniform global safety and pollution standards. Third, Russia may impose supplementary route-specific measures within the competence conferred by the relevant maritime zone and, where applicable, Article 234. Fourth, China implements flag-state and corporate obligations for its ships and enterprises. Fifth, bilateral arrangements coordinate data, services, certificates, emergencies, and consultation without modifying the underlying legal positions.
This hierarchy prevents two opposite errors. The first is to treat IMO rules as a ceiling that automatically invalidates stricter coastal-state measures. Article 234 may authorize more. The second is to treat Article 234 as a self-judging power unaffected by IMO development. The Polar Code changes the regulatory context because it provides internationally accepted solutions against which the necessity of additional measures can be assessed. Good-faith performance and the prohibition of abuse of rights reinforce that relationship[25].
Russian reform should focus on justification and procedural guarantees rather than abandonment of the permit system. The application portal should identify the legal basis for each required document and condition; decisions should be issued within fixed periods; refusals should state reasons; fees should be based on published methodologies; and operators should have access to administrative or judicial review. English and Chinese translations should be authoritative for operational use, while the Russian text remains legally controlling.
Substantively, Russia should replace undifferentiated seasonal assumptions with risk zones updated by scientific evidence. Requirements for escort, pilotage, routing, speed, or reporting should be linked to ice, vessel capability, ecological sensitivity, and emergency-response capacity. National ship-reporting or routing systems that materially affect international navigation should be submitted to the IMO where the applicable instruments contemplate international adoption[26].
The regulatory and commercial roles associated with icebreaker services should also be functionally separated. At minimum, the decision whether assistance is legally required should be reasoned independently from the calculation and sale of the service. Published performance indicators—processing times, refusal grounds, casualties, delays, and non-discrimination data—would strengthen Russia’s claim that the regime protects navigation and the environment rather than controlling market access.
China should adopt a binding Arctic Shipping Compliance Regulation or, as an initial step, mandatory ministerial rules for Chinese-flagged vessels and Chinese-controlled operators. The instrument should require verification of Polar Code and Russian compliance before contracting; voyage-specific ice and emergency risk assessment; certified polar-water competence; adequate insurance and financial security; black-carbon and discharge mitigation; disclosure of incidents and near misses; contingency arrangements for rescue, towing, refuge, and spill response; and environmental and community due diligence for major projects.
The regulation should apply not only to registered shipowners but also, where jurisdiction permits, to state-owned enterprises, charterers, project sponsors, and financial institutions whose decisions determine whether an Arctic voyage proceeds. China could integrate compliance into overseas investment supervision, green-finance standards, and state-owned enterprise performance assessment. This would convert the White Paper’s language of responsible utilization into auditable legal duties.
China should additionally develop Arctic port-state control guidance for vessels arriving at Chinese ports after polar voyages and require preservation of voyage, emissions, ice-routing, and incident data. The objective would not be extraterritorial enforcement of Russian law, but verification that Chinese entities have fulfilled flag-state and corporate obligations and that lessons from each voyage are incorporated into future risk management.
A bilateral intergovernmental agreement or detailed memorandum should address operational matters without conferring exclusive rights. A useful precedent is the 1988 Canada-United States Arctic Cooperation Agreement, which enabled navigation cooperation while expressly preserving legal positions[27]. A Russian-Chinese instrument could contain a comparable “without prejudice” clause concerning maritime zones, baselines, straits, and navigation rights.
The instrument should establish: a joint digital information platform; early notice of regulatory changes; verified Chinese translations; exchange of hydrographic, meteorological, and ice data; mutual recognition or equivalence procedures for certificates and ice-class documentation; joint search-and-rescue and spill-response exercises; procedures for places of refuge and emergency port entry; transparent principles for icebreaker and infrastructure tariffs; a scientific and environmental working group; community consultation; and rapid consultations for disputed permit decisions. It should also promote model contractual clauses for ice delay, compulsory assistance, sanctions, insurance, salvage, and pollution liability.
Mutual recognition must remain conditional on equivalent safety. Polar-class rules developed by classification societies can facilitate technical convergence, but public authorities retain responsibility for certification and enforcement[28]. The goal is not automatic acceptance of every document, but elimination of duplicative review where Russian and Chinese requirements achieve the same protective result.
To make the layered model operational, any supplementary Russian measure affecting foreign navigation should be evaluated through a seven-part test: (1) competence—does the relevant maritime zone and treaty rule authorize it; (2) legitimate purpose—is it genuinely directed to safety or environmental protection; (3) rational connection—does evidence link the measure to the identified risk; (4) necessity—are less restrictive means reasonably available; (5) non-discrimination—are comparable ships treated alike; (6) due regard—has the effect on navigation been balanced; and (7) transparency and review—are reasons, data, duration, and remedies available?[29]
This test does not import a free-standing constitutional standard into UNCLOS. It organizes the express elements of Article 234, the Convention’s good-faith obligations, ordinary treaty interpretation, and the practical relationship between national and IMO regulation. Applied consistently, it would preserve robust environmental control while reducing the risk that a measure is perceived as protectionist, strategic, or permanent despite changing conditions.
7. Conclusion
China’s use of the Northern Sea Route should not be analysed as a choice between unrestricted international navigation and undifferentiated Russian control. The NSR is a statutory management area rather than a single maritime zone. The legal basis of a Russian requirement consequently depends on where the measure applies, what risk it addresses, and how it affects the rights of foreign vessels. Internal waters, the territorial sea, straits, and the exclusive economic zone cannot be treated as though they confer identical regulatory powers.
Article 234 remains central to the regulation of navigation in ice-covered areas, but its authority is purpose-limited and fact-dependent. It permits non-discriminatory measures directed at vessel-source pollution where the conditions specified in the provision are present. Changing ice conditions do not automatically make the provision inapplicable, but they strengthen the case for spatially and temporally differentiated regulation supported by current scientific evidence. The Polar Code supplies a common international baseline. Additional Russian requirements may still be justified, although their legal basis and relationship to the risks not adequately addressed by international standards should be explained more clearly.
China’s Polar Silk Road policy does not itself create navigation rights. Chinese vessels derive such rights from the law of the sea and remain subject to applicable flag-state, coastal-state, and contractual obligations. China would strengthen both its legal position and the credibility of its Arctic policy by developing more consolidated compliance requirements for Chinese-flagged vessels and Chinese-controlled operators. Russia, for its part, would strengthen the legitimacy of the NSR regime through reasoned decisions, transparent service terms, scientific review, and clear differentiation between requirements applicable in different maritime zones.
The layered model proposed in this article is therefore one of calibrated cooperation rather than legal convergence. UNCLOS would continue to determine the basic allocation of rights and jurisdiction; IMO instruments would provide common technical standards; Russia could retain route-specific regulation within the limits of the applicable legal basis; and China could assume more explicit flag-state and corporate responsibilities. A bilateral operational instrument could coordinate information, certificates, emergency response, and services while preserving disagreement over baselines, straits, and navigation rights. The seven factors identified in this article—competence, legitimate purpose, rational connection, necessity, non-discrimination, due regard, and review—are offered as an analytical framework for evaluating supplementary measures, not as a claim that UNCLOS contains a free-standing proportionality test.
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[1] UNCLOS, art. 234. The provision authorizes non-discriminatory laws and regulations for prevention, reduction, and control of vessel-source marine pollution in ice-covered areas within the exclusive economic zone where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation and pollution could cause major harm or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance.
[2] Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980), arts. 31–32.
[3] UNCLOS, arts. 2, 8(2), 17–19, 37–44, 56, 58, and 87. Article 8(2) preserves innocent passage where straight baselines enclose as internal waters areas that had not previously been considered as such.
[4] Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, Judgment, 1949 ICJ Reports 4, 28. The Court’s formulation combines a geographical connection with the use of the strait for international navigation; its application to individual Russian Arctic straits remains disputed and fact-sensitive.
[5] International Maritime Organization (IMO), International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code), Resolution MSC.385(94), 21 November 2014; Resolution MEPC.264(68), 15 May 2015; SOLAS amendments, Resolution MSC.386(94), 21 November 2014; MARPOL amendments, Resolution MEPC.265(68), 15 May 2015. The mandatory regime entered into force on 1 January 2017.
[6] IMO, Resolution MEPC.329(76), Amendments to MARPOL Annex I (Prohibition on the Use and Carriage for Use as Fuel of Heavy Fuel Oil by Ships in Arctic Waters), 17 June 2021. The principal prohibition applies from 1 July 2024, while specified exemptions and coastal-state waivers may postpone full effect for certain ships until 1 July 2029.
[7] IMO, Resolution MSC.532(107), Amendments to SOLAS, 8 June 2023; IMO, Resolution MSC.538(107), Amendments to the Polar Code, 8 June 2023. The amendments entered into force on 1 January 2026 and extend navigation and voyage-planning requirements to specified non-SOLAS ships, including fishing vessels of 24 metres and above, certain pleasure yachts of 300 gross tonnage and above, and cargo ships of 300 to 500 gross tonnage.
[8] Federal Law No. 132-FZ of 28 July 2012, “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Concerning State Regulation of Merchant Shipping in the Water Area of the Northern Sea Route”; Merchant Shipping Code, art. 5.1.
[9] Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, Order No. 17 of 24 January 2022, Rules for Icebreaker Assistance in the Water Area of the Northern Sea Route; Order No. 18 of 24 January 2022, Rules for Escorting Ships along Routes in the Water Area of the Northern Sea Route (as amended by Order No. 395 of 28 September 2022); Order No. 19 of 24 January 2022, Regulations on Hydrometeorological Support for Navigation in the Water Area of the Northern Sea Route.
[10] Federal Law No. 510-FZ of 5 December 2022, amending Federal Law No. 155-FZ of 31 July 1998 “On the Internal Sea Waters, Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone of the Russian Federation,” establishing a special permission procedure for foreign warships and other foreign state vessels operated for non-commercial purposes in internal waters within the NSR area. UNCLOS art. 236 separately preserves sovereign immunity while requiring states to ensure, so far as reasonable and practicable, consistency with the Convention’s environmental rules.
[11] President of the Russian Federation, Decree No. 164 of 5 March 2020, “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic to 2035” (as amended 21 February 2023); President of the Russian Federation, Decree No. 645 of 26 October 2020, “Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and National Security to 2035.”
[12] Erik Franckx, “The Legal Regime of Navigation in the Russian Arctic,” Journal of Transnational Law & Policy 18, no. 2 (2009): 327–342; Jan Jakub Solski, “New Developments in Russian Regulation of Navigation on the Northern Sea Route,” Arctic Review on Law and Politics 4, no. 1 (2013): 90–119.
[13] State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Arctic Policy (Beijing, 26 January 2018), https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm (accessed 15 July 2026).
[14] National Development and Reform Commission and State Oceanic Administration of the People’s Republic of China, Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative (20 June 2017), official English text, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/publications/2017/06/20/content_281475691873460.htm (accessed 15 July 2026).
[15] Maritime Traffic Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China, revised 29 April 2021, Presidential Order No. 79, effective 1 September 2021; Marine Environment Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China, revised 24 October 2023, Presidential Order No. 12, effective 1 January 2024.
[16] Maritime Traffic Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China, arts. 9–14, 33–36, 51–55, and 79–83; Marine Environment Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China, arts. 2–4 and the chapter on pollution from ships and related operations.
[17] Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on Deepening the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination for a New Era on the Occasion of the Seventy-Fifth Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, 16 May 2024, official texts published by the Kremlin and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China.
[18] Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, Nuuk, 12 May 2011; Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic, Kiruna, 15 May 2013; Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation, Fairbanks, 11 May 2017.
[19] IMO, Revised Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, Resolution A.1024(26), 2 December 2009; IMO, Polar Code, Introduction and Parts I-A and II-A. The Code is predominantly risk-based and certificate-driven, but several environmental issues—including black carbon, underwater noise, and grey water—remain incompletely regulated at the binding global level.
[20] MARPOL Annex I, regulation 43A, as adopted by Resolution MEPC.329(76). The delayed application and waiver structure illustrates the difficulty of converting environmental precaution into uniform operational obligations in the Arctic.
[21] UNCLOS, arts. 192, 194, 211, 212, and 234; Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), 14 June 1992, principles 15 and 16.
[22] International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, adopted 30 November 1990, 1891 UNTS 51 (entered into force 13 May 1995); International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, adopted 23 March 2001, 2307 UNTS 1 (entered into force 21 November 2008).
[23] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Maritime Transport 2024 (Geneva: United Nations, 2024), chapters on maritime chokepoints and shipping risk. The NSR should not be treated as a legally or commercially automatic substitute for established corridors; reliability, insurance, ice-class tonnage, emergency support, and seasonal variability remain decisive.
[24] United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN General Assembly Resolution 61/295, 13 September 2007, arts. 18, 19, 25, 29, and 32; Federal Law of the Russian Federation No. 82-FZ of 30 April 1999, “On Guarantees of the Rights of Indigenous Small-Numbered Peoples of the Russian Federation” (as amended).
[25] UNCLOS, arts. 300 and 301. Article 300 requires good faith and prohibits abuse of rights; it is particularly relevant where formally environmental measures have substantial effects on navigation and commercial access.
[26] IMO, Guidelines and Criteria for Ship Reporting Systems, Resolution MSC.43(64), 9 December 1994, as amended; UNCLOS, art. 211(6). Measures affecting international navigation gain legitimacy and predictability when developed or recognized through competent international organizations where the Convention so requires.
[27] Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America on Arctic Cooperation, Ottawa, 11 January 1988, 1852 UNTS 59. Its “without prejudice” formula is a useful model for operational cooperation despite unresolved legal positions.
[28] International Association of Classification Societies, Unified Requirements for Polar Class Ships, UR I1–I3 (as revised). Classification rules are private technical standards, but they interact directly with flag-state certification, insurance, chartering, and Russian operational requirements.
[29] UNCLOS, art. 234; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31–32. The proposed test in this article is an interpretive framework rather than a claim that UNCLOS expressly uses the vocabulary of proportionality.
Информация об авторе:
Ма Боцзяэр, аспирант кафедры международного права, РУДН
Information about the author:
Ma Bojiaer, phd student, Department of International law, RUDN University
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