This article examines the international legal framework governing the use of force under the United Nations Charter, focusing on the post-1945 world order and the implications of key Charter provisions such as Articles 2(4), 25, 39, 41, 42, 43, 48, 51, 52, 53, 54, and 103. The analysis traces the evolution of the UN’s role in conflict prevention and enforcement, highlighting the legal authority of the Security Council and the limits imposed on regional organizations under Chapter VIII. By integrating historical case studies, including the Nicaragua v. United States judgment, ECOWAS interventions in Sierra Leone and Liberia, and the AU-UN cooperation in Darfur, the study assesses the effectiveness of the Charter’s legal regime in addressing contemporary threats. The article further explores the inherent tension between state sovereignty and security measures, illustrating how regional organizations navigate the constraints of Article 53 while attempting to implement enforcement measures without prior Security Council authorization. Ultimately, the research underscores the legal and operational complexities of the UN’s enforcement mandate and its implications for global governance and international law
Keywords: UN Charter, Use of Force, Unilateral Coercive Measures, Public International Law, Regional Organizations, Security Council, Collective Security, ECOWAS, AU-UN Cooperation, ICJ
Применение силы в соответствии с Уставом ООН: практика и проблемы
В этой статье рассматриваются международные правовые рамки, регулирующие применение силы в соответствии с Уставом Организации Объединенных Наций, с упором на мировой порядок после 1945 года и последствия ключевых положений Устава, таких как статьи 2(4), 25, 39, 41, 42, 43, 48, 51, 52, 53, 54 и 103. Анализ прослеживает эволюцию роли ООН в предотвращении конфликтов и обеспечении их соблюдения, подчеркивая правовые полномочия Совета Безопасности и ограничения, налагаемые на региональные организации в соответствии с Главой VIII. Интегрируя исторические тематические исследования, включая решение по делу Никарагуа против Соединенных Штатов, вмешательства ЭКОВАС в Сьерра-Леоне и Либерии и сотрудничество АС и ООН в Дарфуре, исследование оценивает эффективность правового режима Устава в борьбе с современными угрозами. В статье далее исследуется внутренняя напряженность между государственным суверенитетом и мерами безопасности, иллюстрируя, как региональные организации обходят ограничения статьи 53, пытаясь реализовать меры принуждения без предварительного разрешения Совета Безопасности. В конечном итоге исследование подчеркивает правовые и оперативные сложности мандата ООН по обеспечению соблюдения прав и его последствия для глобального управления и международного права.
Ключевые слова: Устав ООН, Применение силы, Односторонние принудительные меры, Публичное международное право, Региональные организации, Совет Безопасности, Коллективная безопасность, ЭКОВАС, Сотрудничество Африканского союза и ООН, Международный Суд
Introduction
The UN Charter, adopted at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, represents a milestone in the development of international law. Its purpose was to prevent future conflicts by establishing a legal framework for state conduct, particularly regarding the use of force. The Charter’s emphasis on peaceful dispute settlement, coupled with the establishment of binding obligations under Article 25, underscores its importance as a source of international law. Nevertheless, the rise of unilateral coercive measures, particularly those imposed under the guise of collective security, raises questions about the Charter’s ability to prevent coercive state practices that undermine state sovereignty. Additionally, Articles 2(4), 39, and 51 form the core of the Charter’s regulatory framework on the use of force, delineating the circumstances under which force may be legally employed. (The International Court of Justice [ICJ], Paras. 1986. 190- 193) ruling in the Nicaragua v. United States case further affirmed the customary nature of the prohibition on the use of force as articulated in Article 2(4), reinforcing the Charter’s legal authority.
The primary objective of this article is to critically assess the legal framework established by the UN Charter concerning the use of force and to evaluate its effectiveness in the context of contemporary security challenges. By examining key Charter provisions, including Articles 39–51 and 103, the article explores the scope of Security Council authority, and the limitations imposed on regional organizations.
Additionally, the article utilizes case studies involving ECOWAS interventions in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the AU-UN cooperation in Darfur, and the implications of NATO’s intervention in Libya to illustrate the complexities of enforcing international law within a fragmented global order.
1. The Contemporary International Legal Order and the Role of the United Nations
The catastrophic devastation of World War II made clear the urgent need for a legal and institutional framework that could prevent future conflicts and provide mechanisms for peaceful dispute resolution. The failure of the League of Nations, which had lacked enforcement capacity and was crippled by unchecked veto powers, underscored the necessity for a stronger international organization. In response, the United Nations (UN) was founded in 1945 to uphold international peace and legal order (United Nations, 1945).
The Charter of the United Nations, adopted at the San Francisco Conference and enacted on October 24, 1945, serves as the foundational legal document of the post-war international system. Its Preamble affirms the determination “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,” to reaffirm “faith in fundamental human rights,” and to ensure respect for international law and treaty obligations (United Nations, 1945, Preamble). However, the emergence of unilateral coercive measures, often imposed under the pretext of maintaining international security, has raised concerns regarding the effectiveness of the Charter in addressing coercive state practices that undermine state sovereignty.
Two central provisions of the Charter form the legal backbone of the new world order. Article 1 defines the purposes of the UN, including the maintenance of international peace and security, the development of friendly relations among nations, and the promotion of international cooperation. Article 2(4) introduces a critical innovation in international law, prohibiting the threat or use of force in a way that challenges another state’s territorial integrity or political independence (United Nations, 1945, art. 2[4]). Maddox (1984) argues that although the Charter provided a stronger legal framework than the League of Nations, its potential was quickly undermined by Cold War rivalries. According to him, the UN, rather than functioning as a robust collective security mechanism, became a venue for ideological battles between the United States and the Soviet Union. Each side used the forum to attack the other’s actions while undermining genuine negotiation efforts (Maddox, 1984, pp. 85–86).
1.1. Legal Authority and Institutional Structure of the United Nations
Despite some limitations in practice, the UN has remained central to the post-1945 legal order. Its Charter continues to function as a source of legitimacy in international affairs, and its principles form the basis for multilateralism and international responsibility (Weiss & Daws, 2018, p. 20).
This centrality was reaffirmed in the 1986 Nicaragua v. United States judgment of the International Court of Justice, where the Court held that the prohibition of the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter had become a norm of customary international law.The Court found that, even in the absence of effective institutional enforcement, the Charter provided the legal standard by which state conduct was to be judged (The International Court of Justice [ICJ], Paras. 1986. 190- 193).
The United Nations, established in 1945 through the Charter of the United Nations, comprises six principal organs, each serving a distinct function while operating under a unified legal framework. The Charter defines not only the structure of these bodies but also their powers, interrelationships, and responsibilities in advancing international peace, development, and cooperation. At the core of the UN’s structure is the General Assembly,the only body where all member states are equally represented, each with one vote as stated in Article 9. It functions as a forum for multilateral discussion on global issues and holds significant influence through its power to make recommendations on matters within the scope of the Charter (United Nations, 1945, art.10).
The Assembly is responsible for approving the UN budget (United Nations, 1945, art. 17), admitting new members upon the recommendation of the Security Council (United Nations, 1945, art. 4), and electing members to other UN organs, including the non-permanent members of the Security Council and the judges of the International Court of Justice (United Nations, 1945, arts. 18–19).
Another essential body is the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which coordinates international efforts in economic, social, and humanitarian fields. According to Article 62, ECOSOC may initiate studies, issue reports, and make recommendations to promote human rights and social progress (United Nations, 1945). It also maintains vital relationships with specialized agencies such as the WHO and ILO under Article 63 and consults with non-governmental organizations under Article 71, making it a key organ for development-oriented diplomacy and norm-setting (United Nations, 1945).
Judicial authority within the UN is vested in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which, under Articles 92–96, functions as the principal judicial organ. The ICJ resolves legal disputes between states and provides advisory opinions on legal questions referred by other organs (United Nations, 1945). Its decisions in contentious cases are binding on the states involved, as specified in Article 94, and compliance can be enforced through the Security Council if necessary (United Nations, 1945). The ICJ plays a crucial role in promoting the rule of international law.
The Secretariat, led by the Secretary-General, is responsible for the UN’s administrative operations. As outlined in Articles 97–101, the Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council and serves as the chief administrative officer of the organization (United Nations, 1945). The Secretary-General also has the authority under Article 99 to bring to the Security Council’s attention any matter which may threaten international peace and security, giving the office a proactive role in conflict prevention and early warning diplomacy (United Nations, 1945).
Historically, the Trusteeship Council was established to oversee the administration of trust territories and ensure their progression toward self-government or independence. According to Articles 86–91, it monitored the administration of territories placed under the trusteeship system, primarily through reporting and on-site missions (United Nations, 1945). Since the independence of Palau in 1994, the last trust territory, the Trusteeship Council has suspended operations, though it remains formally in existence under the Charter.[1] The Charter formally defines the role and structure of the Trusteeship Council (United Nations, 1945, arts. 86–91).
The Security Council is the most powerful organ within the UN system, endowed with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under Article 24 (United Nations, 1945). It is composed of fifteen members: five permanent members—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—with veto power, and ten non-permanent members elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms, as detailed in Article 23 (United Nations, 1945). Each member has one vote, but the adoption of substantive decisions requires the concurring votes of all five permanent members under Article 27(United Nations, 1945).
The Security Council holds extensive and legally binding powers under Chapter VII of theUN Charter, specifically articulated in Articles 39–51(United Nations, 1945). According to Article 39, the Council has the authority to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and to decide upon the measures required to address it:
«The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security» (United Nations, 1945, art.39).
However, in cases involving unilateral coercive measures, states often bypass the Council’s authority by imposing economic restrictions, travel bans, or asset freezes without explicit Security Council authorization, raising concerns about the erosion of the Council’s legal supremacy under Article 39 (United Nations, 1945).
Under Article 41, the Council can implement non-military measures, including sanctions, embargoes, and travel bans: «The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures…» (United Nations, 1945, art.41)
If non-military measures under Article 41 are deemed insufficient, the Council may escalate to military actions under Article 42, authorizing the use of force:
«Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security…» (United Nations, 1945, art.42).
1.2. Article 25 – Binding Obligations
Moreover, under Article 25, all UN member states are obligated to comply with the Security Council’s decisions:
«The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.» (United Nations, 1945, art.25).Therefore, the Security Council is the only UN body with the authority to impose legally binding obligations on member states, encompassing both non-military and military measures as necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Additionally, the Security Council plays a vital procedural role in the UN system: it recommends the admission of new members to the General Assembly (United Nations, 1945, art. 4), participates in the appointment of the Secretary-General (United Nations, 1945, art. 97), and may enforce ICJ decisions when states fail to comply (United Nations, 1945, art, 94). This concentration of authority makes the Security Council the central enforcer of the international legal order as envisioned by the Charter’s drafters. Together, these six organs embody the UN’s commitment to peace, cooperation, law, and human dignity. The Charter carefully balances moral authority, legal structure, and executive power across these bodies, with the Security Council standing as the ultimate guardian of global peace under international law.
2. Regional Organizations within the International Legal System:
Definitions, Functions, and Prominent Examples (AU, EU, OAS, etc.)
After World War II, particularly from the 1960s onwards, nations increasingly recognized the importance of international cooperation through regional organizations. The significance of regional cooperation grew as it was seen as a strategic approach not only for addressing international crises but also for enhancing collaboration and alignment among states in confronting emerging global challenges. Regionalism, while promoting economic cooperation, also fosters political and security convergence, offering peaceful solutions to existing and potential conflicts and contributing to the consolidation of regional peace and security (Mehkui & Bavir, 2025, pp. 137-139).
The UN Charter establishes a dual framework for international security governance, combining centralized authority through the Security Council with regional conflict management under Chapter VIII. Article 24 designates the Security Council as the primary body for maintaining international peace and security, stating:
«Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security» (United Nations, 1945, art. 24).
While Article 24 focuses on centralized authority, Articles 52 to 54 outline the role of regional organizations in conflict prevention, enforcement actions (with Security Council authorization), and mandatory reporting to ensure transparency and accountability. After the Cold War, regional organizations increasingly utilized this framework to address conflicts in areas such as West Africa and Eastern Europe (UNRO, 1999, pp. 6-11).
According to Chalmers and Slupska (2019), the authority of regional organizations often stems from narratives regarding the character and function of states within the region. They argue that the dominant narratives include:
- Civilizational narrative: Focusing on governance quality and public sphere development.
- Competitiveness narrative: Centered on economic strength and market integration (Chalmers, 2019, p. 166).
However, the use of unilateral coercive measures within these narratives complicates the legal landscape, as states or regional bodies may justify coercive actions as protective measures aligned with regional stability, even in the absence of UN authorization. This approach effectively blurs the line between legitimate enforcement and coercive state practices, raising concerns about the erosion of international legal norms. Regional security organizations also develop tools to foster trust among member states. For example:
- CSCE: Establishing special envoys and contact groups in key conflict zones in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
- ASEAN: Drawing inspiration from the CSCE, ASEAN initiated mechanisms and workshops focused on conflict prevention after the Cambodian conflict (Barnett, 1995, p. 423).
- OAU: In June 1993, the OAU established the Mechanism on Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution, emphasizing preventive diplomacy, fact-finding, and the use of good offices, with special representatives in key conflict zones (Barnett, 1995, p. 423).
Regional organizations based on economic, cultural, and security factors may not always align geographically. This non-contiguity can complicate their operational dynamics (Gaudry, Sada, & Shaban, 2017, p. 2). Furthermore, Gaudry, Sada, and Shaban (2017) categorize security-based regional organizations into four subtypes:
- Alliance-based: Focused on collective defense, such as NATO.
- Collective security: Preventing inter-state conflicts, e.g., OAS.
- Security regimes: Addressing specific security issues, e.g., ASEAN.
- Security communities: Promoting shared norms and common identities (Gaudry, Sada, & Shaban, 2017, pp. 2-3).
ASEAN, ASEAN Plus Three, and the Asia Cooperation Dialogue exemplify how regional organizations can expand their focus to include economic and political dimensions, effectively bridging local and global governance structures (Hartley & Newman, 2019, pp. 278-279). Regional governance structures challenge the traditional notion of state sovereignty by creating new layers of decision-making authority. This creates both opportunities and risks for member states (Weiss, 2000, p. 806).
Regional organizations are not merely executors of international law but also platforms for creating alternative normative frameworks.Chalmers (2019) highlights how these organizations often challenge the established legal hierarchy by asserting frameworks that diverge from UN-centric norms. He notes, «regional organizations often expose international law to intense political contestation» as they attempt to realize public goods through tailored programs (Chalmers, 2019, p. 166). Lewis (2006) underscores the growing importance of these frameworks in structuring both economic and legal interactions on a global scale, emphasizing that regional linkages increasingly serve as vital components of the international legal system (Lewis, 2006, p. 18).
The development and operationalization of regional organizations have increasingly blurred the boundaries between global and local governance structures. Through conflict prevention mechanisms, enforcement capabilities, and normative frameworks, these organizations not only supplement but also challenge the traditional international legal order. The dual framework established under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter provides a legal basis for regional conflict management, aligning regional initiatives with global security norms under the Security Council’s oversight (UNRO, 1999, pp. 6-11).
However, the assertion of normative frameworks by regional organizations introduces new complexities, questioning the hegemony of established international law and highlighting the evolving nature of regionalism in the 21st century.
3. Relationship between Regional organisations and the United Nations
3.1. Legal Basis of Cooperation between Regional Organisations and the United Nations
The legal foundation for the interaction between the United Nations and regional organisations is articulated in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, particularly Articles 52 to 54. These provisions recognise the legitimacy and potential usefulness of regional arrangements in maintaining peace and security, while simultaneously ensuring the primacy of the UN Security Council in matters involving enforcement action (Villani, 2001, p. 540; Cha, 2002, p. 144).
Article 52(1) provides that: «Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action…» (United Nations, 1945, art. 52).This reflects the permissive character of the Charter: it allows regional organisations to exist and to act in matters appropriate for local resolution. However, their role is limited to peaceful dispute settlement unless otherwise authorised by the Security Council. (Security Council Report, 2024)
Under the UN Charter, regional organizations are prohibited from undertaking enforcement actions, whether military or non-military, without the explicit authorization of the Security Council. Article 53 clearly states: «…no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council…» (United Nations, 1945, art. 53). The term «enforcement action»under Article 53 of the UN Charter has been the subject of debate, particularly regarding whether it encompasses non-military measures. Although Article 53 explicitly prohibits any enforcement actions by regional organizations without prior Security Council authorization, practice has shown some divergence. For instance, the EU, ECOWAS, and the League of Arab States have imposed Unilateral Coercive Measures without explicit Council approval, as seen in cases like Myanmar (2023) and Syria (2011). Despite lacking formal authorization, these measures have often been met with acquiescence from member states, leading many international lawyers to conclude that «enforcement action» primarily refers to coercive military actions conducted without the consent of the targeted state (Security Council Report, 2023, p.11-12).
However, Article 51 provides an exception for actions taken in self-defence: «Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs…» (United Nations, 1945, art. 51). In cases where a state or regional organization undertakes measures in self-defence against an armed attack, such actions are permissible but must be immediately reported to the Security Council. This ensures that while self-defence actions can be initiated without prior authorization, they remain subject to oversight and review by the Security Council (Bröhmer, Ress, & Walter, 2012, p.1497).
Furthermore, the differentiation between military and non-military enforcement measures is significant. While Article 53 prohibits both types of actions without authorization, the nature of enforcement is further clarified in Articles 25 and 48(United Nations, 1945, arts. 25, 48). Moreover, under Article 25, all UN member states are obligated to comply with the Security Council’s decisions:
«The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.» (United Nations, 1945, art. 25) Article 48 allows the Council to call for coordinated action by member states, including through regional arrangements, for implementing both military and non-military measures (United Nations 1945, art. 48).
Under Article 43, member states are expected to make military forces and assistance available to the Security Council for enforcement purposes. However, Article 43 introduces a crucial distinction by stipulating that the Security Council cannot compel regional organizations to undertake military measures without special agreements: «All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council… armed forces, assistance, and facilities…» (United Nations 1945, art. 43).In conclusion, while regional organizations can play a vital role in maintaining peace and security, their enforcement actions must adhere strictly to the Charter’s framework. Without explicit Security Council authorization, such actions are deemed unauthorized and potentially unlawful under international law, except in cases of self-defence as per Article 51.
Article 54 further codifies the principle of transparency and coordination: «The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements…» (UN Charter, art. 54). Thus, regional bodies must not only refrain from unauthorised enforcement actions but also report all such activities to the Security Council (Cha, 2002, p. 144). This structure reflects a legal framework in which regional organisations are permitted to act, but only under the authority and with the explicit authorisation of the UN Security Council. As a result, regional enforcement actions are welcomed insofar as they operate within the boundaries of a system that clearly subordinates them to the universal authority of the United Nations (Villani, 2001, p. 540; Cha, 2002, p. 144).
3.2. Legal Hierarchy in Case of Conflict Between UN and Regional Organisation Obligations
In cases where actions or decisions taken by regional organisations diverge from those of the United Nations, a fundamental legal question arises: which obligations prevail? This issue is especially critical in the context of peace and security, where regional actors may respond to crises independently of, or even contrary to, the authority of the UN Security Council.
Article 103 – Supremacy Clause:
The legal resolution of such conflicts is provided in Article 103 of the UN Charter, which states:
«In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail» (United Nations, 1945, art. 103).
This provision has long been interpreted to affirm the supremacy of the UN Charter in the international legal order. Villani (2001) stresses that “any enforcement action by regional organisations must be subordinate to, and authorised by, the UN Security Council” (p. 540). Likewise, Sthoeger (2024) explains that Article 103 functions as a structural safeguard in times of normative tension, especially when multiple treaty regimes threaten legal coherence (pp. 160–162).
The contemporary international legal order is shaped by structural complexities that extend beyond the traditional state-based framework. Legal convergence beyond the nation-state is marked by conceptual ambiguity, fragmented authority, and tensions between sovereignty, jurisdiction, and transnational governance. Klabbers, as cited in Fahey (2020), characterises this dynamic through the triadic pressures of fragmentation, verticalisation, and constitutionalisation (p. 15). These features, combined with the unresolved «trilemma» of self-determination, democracy, and hyper-globalisation, contribute to the legal uncertainty that defines the post-1945 global legal environment.
As Fahey notes, when international and regional organisations promote conflicting normative visions, their legal interpretations inevitably diverge, creating structural tensions. In the context of the UN Charter’s use-of-force regime, such divergences can weaken coordinated responses and blur the boundaries of legal authority (Fahey, 2020, pp. 17–18).
A relevant case illustrating this complexity is the 2011 intervention in Libya, where both NATO and the African Union (AU) were engaged but with diverging mandates. NATO acted under UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which authorised “all necessary measures” to protect civilians, including the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya (UN Security Council, 2011, para. 4). In contrast, the African Union pursued a diplomatic roadmap prioritising ceasefire and negotiations between Libyan factions. According to Abass (2014), this divergence stemmed from contrasting interpretations of «legitimate order» under Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act, either as protection of legitimate governance, or of peace and stability as defined by the AU Peace and Security Council (pp. 134–138).
Article 52 of the UN Charter encourages regional arrangements to resolve disputes locally before referring them to the Security Council; however, it does not diminish the Council’s authority to intervene or investigate even when regional efforts are ongoing (United Nations, 1945, art. 52). Despite early interpretations suggesting that regional arrangements have priority, the Council has frequently acted regardless of ongoing regional initiatives, as seen in Myanmar post-2021 coup. Nevertheless, under Article 103, the UN Charter maintains legal primacy, ensuring that regional actions must align with UN obligations and cannot operate as autonomous legal authorities (United Nations, 1945, art. 103). While regional organizations play a vital role in maintaining peace and security, their mandates must conform to the UN framework, reflecting the Charter’s hierarchical structure in international law (Security Council Report, 2023, p.12).
3.3. Coordination and Complementarity between the UN Security Council and Regional Organisations
The evolving landscape of international peace and security necessitates robust collaboration between the United Nations (UN) Security Council and regional organisations.Chapter VIII of the UN Charter provides the legal framework for such cooperation, emphasizing the role of regional arrangements in maintaining peace and security, provided their activities align with the purposes and principles of the UN.
Regional organizations have long been considered essential complements to the United Nations system in managing localized conflicts. Article 52 of the UN Charter provides the foundational legal basis for the role of such organizations in the peaceful resolution of regional disputes.
According to Article 52 of the UN Charter:
“The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.” (United Nations, 1945, art.52)
This principle is illustrated in the case of ECOWAS’s intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In a similar development, the United Nations Security Council provided formal authorization for the ECOWAS intervention only months after ECOWAS foreign ministers had already endorsed the use of force (Doktori, 2008, p. 339). This sequence demonstrates the intended logic of Article 52: local and regional efforts to resolve disputes should precede UN Security Council involvement. The ECOWAS example reflects a pragmatic application of this provision, where the regional body acted first, and the UN subsequently recognized and supported the initiative.
While the UN Charter encourages cooperation with regional organizations, it also imposes clear limitations on enforcement actions conducted outside its direct authority. Article 53 outlines the conditions under which the Security Council may authorize these organizations to engage in enforcement operations. Article 53 provides that:
“The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council…” (United Nations, 1945, Article 53).
This article underscores that while the Security Council may employ regional organizations for enforcement actions, such measures require its explicit authorization to ensure centralized oversight and international legitimacy.
A pertinent example is the intervention of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Sierra Leone during the late 1990s. Following a military coup in 1997 that ousted the democratically elected government, ECOWAS, through its Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), initiated military operations to restore constitutional order. The UN Security Council subsequently endorsed this regional action through Resolution 1132.
“Acting also under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes ECOWAS, cooperating with the democratically elected Government of Sierra Leone, to ensure strict implementation of the provisions of this resolution…”
(UNSC Resolution 1132, 1997, para. 8)
This clause clearly demonstrates that ECOWAS’s enforcement role was formally sanctioned under both Chapter VII and Chapter VIII of the Charter, aligning it with the requirements of Article 53.
3.4.Reporting Obligations and UN Oversight under Article 54: Lessons from UNAMID in Darfur
Effective coordination between the United Nations and regional organizations requires not only legal authorization but also procedural transparency. Article 54 formalizes the duty of these organizations to keep the Security Council fully informed of all activities related to the maintenance of international peace and security.
According to Article 54 of the UN Charter:
“The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.”
(United Nations, 1945, art. 54). This provision emphasizes the obligation of regional organizations and arrangements to maintain regular communication with the Security Council, ensuring that all relevant actions are transparent, coordinated, and subject to UN oversight.
A prime example of this principle in practice is the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), established by Security Council Resolution 1769 (2007). The mission represented an unprecedented institutional collaboration between the UN and a regional organization, the African Union, combining resources and strategic frameworks to address the complex humanitarian and political crisis in Sudan. As noted by the Stimson Center:
“The establishment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in 2007 was the outcome of a highly contentious, complex process that broke new ground for the UN in a number of ways.”
(Stimson Center, 2020, p. 45)
This arrangement entailed constant reporting and close coordination between the AU and the UN, fully aligning with the spirit and obligations set forth under Article 54 of the UN Charter.
4. Advantages and Challenges of UN-Regional Cooperation
- Enhanced Legitimacy: Regional organisations often enjoy greater legitimacy in peacekeeping contexts due to their geographical proximity and cultural relevance. Unlike UN forces composed of distant nations with limited contextual understanding, regional actors are more likely to gain the trust and confidence of local populations and conflicting parties, thereby facilitating more effective intervention (Jetley, 2010, p. 29).
- Rapid Deployment: Regional organisations benefit from their geographical proximity and contextual familiarity, which allow them to take timely and locally informed action in emerging crises. However, despite these advantages, their effectiveness is often hampered by limited institutional capacity and the need for substantial external assistance, particularly in fragile regions lacking robust regional structures (Williams, 2008, pp. 312–327).
- Strategic Division of Roles:A more structured partnership between the UN and regional organisations like the AU enables them to complement each other’s capabilities and share the burden of peace operations. Such burden-sharing arrangements improve coordination and operational efficiency in addressing global peace and security challenges (de Coning & Peter, 2019, pp. 224–228).
Challenges:
- Mandate Overlaps: Some of the Regional organizations’s efforts in peace operations, such as in Darfur, are often constrained by narrowly defined mandates and limited operational autonomy. While the AU is expected to align interventions with local needs, its growing reliance on the UN and the presence of dominant UN personnel have raised concerns about a potential shift toward hybrid paternalism, undermining the AU’s ownership of its missions (Murithi, 2008, pp. 74- 79).
- Resource Constraints: Regional organisations, such as the African Union (AU), often face severe logistical and operational limitations that hinder their ability to fulfil protection mandates. For instance, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) demonstrated limited effectiveness due to insufficient resources and support infrastructure (Powell & Baranyi, 2005, p. 3).
- Coordination Difficulties:Divergent views on the necessity of Security Council authorisation for regional peace operations illustrate the persistent challenge of achieving coherent and coordinated action between the UN and regional organisations (Zwanenburg, 2006, p. 508).
- The synergy between the UN Security Council and regional organizations remains pivotal for maintaining international peace and security. While challenges persist, the legal framework provided by the UN Charter facilitates cooperation by leveraging the comparative strengths of both global and regional actors. To ensure that such collaboration delivers meaningful results, transparent mandates, predictable coordination, and equitable burden-sharing must be institutionalized within a system that balances delegated authority with centralized oversight.
Conclusion
The legal framework established by the UN Charter for the use of force serves as a cornerstone of post-1945 international law. While the Charter clearly articulates the principles of state sovereignty and the prohibition of the use of force under Article 2(4), the practical implementation of these principles has revealed significant complexities (UN Charter, art. 2[4]). The Security Council, under Articles 39–51, is granted primary authority to assess and respond to threats to international peace and security, utilizing measures ranging from sanctions (Article 41) to military interventions (Article 42). However, the Council’s effectiveness has been hampered by political gridlocks and inconsistent enforcement, as evidenced by the interventions in Libya and Darfur (UNSC Resolution 1973, 2011; UNSC Resolution 1769, 2007). Additionally, the rise of unilateral coercive measures by regional organisations, particularly in the form of economic sanctions and travel bans, has further complicated the enforcement landscape, as such measures often bypass UN authorization while exerting indirect coercive pressure on target states.
Regional organizations, operating under the framework of Chapter VIII, present both opportunities and challenges in the enforcement of international law. Articles 52–54 outline the permissible scope of regional enforcement actions, yet these provisions remain contested, particularly regarding the extent of autonomy that regional bodies may exercise without prior Security Council authorization (UN Charter, arts. 52–54). The ECOWAS interventions in Sierra Leone and Liberia illustrate instances where regional organizations have acted beyond their formal mandate, initially proceeding without explicit UN approval but subsequently receiving retroactive endorsement (Doktori, 2008, p. 339). However, in cases involving unilateral coercive measures, regional bodies may assert independent enforcement authority, effectively challenging the primacy of the Security Council as the sole arbiter of international security mandates.
The International Court of Justice’s ruling in Nicaragua v. United States further underscored the customary nature of the prohibition of force as stipulated in Article 2(4), reinforcing the Charter’s authority as the primary legal framework governing state conduct in international relations (ICJ, 1986, paras. 190–193). However, as Bedjaoui (2014) argues, the evolving nature of global security governance necessitates a more balanced combination of regional and global mechanisms to address emerging threats effectively (pp. 230-231). Such a combination would require a shift from the vertical UN-led model towards a more integrated and horizontal framework where regional organizations play a more pronounced role while remaining aligned with the Charter’s overarching principles. Nevertheless, the continued use of unilateral coercive measures risks undermining such integration, as states and regional bodies may circumvent the Charter’s legal framework under the guise of regional security, effectively creating parallel enforcement regimes that conflict with the Security Council’s mandate.
Ultimately, the Charter’s legal framework, while comprehensive in theory, faces substantial operational challenges in practice. The decline in UN authority, coupled with the increasing assertiveness of regional organizations, raises critical questions regarding the future of international peace and security governance. A multilateral-regional strategy, as proposed by Bedjaoui (2014), offers a plausible pathway forward, allowing for a more nuanced distribution of responsibilities while maintaining the UN’s central role in enforcing legal norms. However, addressing the rise of unilateral coercive measures will require stricter oversight mechanisms, enhanced reporting obligations under Article 54, and a reaffirmation of the Security Council’s central authority in order to prevent fragmentation of enforcement authority and ensure the uniform application of international law.
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Информация об авторе: Захра Фаллах, Российский университет дружбы народов
Information about the author: Zahra Fallah, Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia
[1] https://www.un.org/en/about-us/trusteeship-council
