Protracted conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the wider Great Lakes region endures despite numerous peace accords, primarily due to fragmented legal mechanisms, weak enforcement, and state fragility. This article critically examines existing legal and institutional frameworks for conflict resolution, including the African Union’s Peace and Security Council, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC), and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). Using the DRC as a case study, the analysis identifies structural gaps such as overlapping mandates, insufficient compliance with regional treaties, impunity for cross-border armed groups, and limited victim participation in transitional justice processes. Drawing on theoretical foundations including regionalism, security complex theory, subsidiarity, and Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the article argues that current frameworks are predominantly reactive rather than preventive, consequently failing to address root causes such as land rights, ethnic marginalization, and illegal resource exploitation. The study proposes a sustainable legal framework structured around four pillars: harmonization of regional and domestic laws on armed group accountability, a binding cross-border early warning and mediation protocol, community-based restorative justice mechanisms integrated with formal courts, and enforceable legal provisions for natural resource governance. Additionally, the article advocates for hybrid peacekeeping models, as exemplified by UNAMID and AMISOM, to mitigate regional rivalries and mandate overlaps. The article concludes that achieving legal sustainability necessitates institutional redesign, sustained political will among member states, and localized ownership of justice processes to foster durable peace in the Region.
Keywords: Conflict resolution, legal framework, Great Lakes region, Democratic Republic of the Congo, armed groups, transitional justice, restorative justice, cross-border mediation, natural resource governance, impunity, regional treaties, African Union, ICGLR, MONUSCO.
К устойчивой международно-правовой основе для разрешения конфликтов в районе Великих Озер: пример ДРК
Аннотация: Затяжной конфликт в Демократической Республике Конго (ДРК) и в более широком регионе Великих озер продолжается, несмотря на многочисленные мирные соглашения, главным образом из-за фрагментированных правовых механизмов, слабого правоприменения и нестабильности государства. В данной статье критически рассматриваются существующие правовые и институциональные рамки для разрешения конфликтов, включая Совет мира и безопасности Африканского союза, Международную конференцию по региону Великих озер (МКГОО), Сообщество развития Южной Африки (САДК), Восточноафриканское сообщество (ВАС) и Миссию Организации Объединенных Наций по стабилизации в Демократической Республике Конго (МОНУСКО). На примере ДРК анализ выявляет структурные пробелы, такие как дублирование мандатов, недостаточное соблюдение региональных договоров, безнаказанность трансграничных вооруженных групп и ограниченное участие жертв в процессах переходного правосудия. Опираясь на теоретические основы, включая регионализм, теорию комплекса безопасности, принцип субсидиарности и главу VIII Устава ООН, статья утверждает, что существующие рамки носят преимущественно реактивный, а не превентивный характер, и, следовательно, не решают коренные проблемы, такие как земельные права, этническая маргинализация и незаконная эксплуатация ресурсов. В исследовании предлагается устойчивая правовая основа, построенная на четырех столпах: гармонизация регионального и национального законодательства об ответственности вооруженных групп, обязательный трансграничный протокол раннего предупреждения и посредничества, механизмы восстановительного правосудия на уровне общин, интегрированные с формальными судами, и подлежащие исполнению правовые положения в области управления природными ресурсами. Кроме того, статья выступает за гибридные модели миротворчества, примером которых являются UNAMID и AMISOM, для смягчения регионального соперничества и дублирования мандатов. В заключение статьи делается вывод о том, что для достижения правовой устойчивости необходимы институциональная перестройка, устойчивая политическая воля государств-членов и локальная ответственность за процессы правосудия для обеспечения прочного мира в регионе.
Ключевые слова: разрешение конфликтов, правовая база, регион Великих озер, Демократическая Республика Конго, вооруженные группы, переходное правосудие, восстановительное правосудие, трансграничная медиация, управление природными ресурсами, безнаказанность, региональные договоры, Африканский союз, МКГЛР, МОНУСКО.
Introduction
The persistent instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the wider Great Lakes region represents a significant challenge for both African and international peace and security governance.[1] This article provides an in-depth analysis of the regional and international legal frameworks that shape intervention, cooperation, and conflict management within this context. The central argument is that, despite Africa’s increasingly sophisticated peace and security architecture, substantial discrepancies persist between the continent’s normative commitments and its operational implementation.[2] These discrepancies, compounded by diplomatic fragmentation, resource limitations, and geopolitical rivalries, continue to constrain the effectiveness of regional and sub-regional responses to crises such as the DRC conflict.
African regional organizations, notably the African Union (AU), Southern African Development Community (SADC), International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), and East African Community (EAC), have developed overlapping mandates governing intervention, conflict resolution, and civilian protection.[3] These institutions operate within a complex legal environment, underpinned by instruments such as the AU Constitutive Act, the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC Protocol), the SADC Mutual Defense Pact, the ICGLR Pact on Security, Stability and Development, and the EAC Treaty. Despite the robustness of this normative framework, these organizations have not consistently demonstrated the political coherence or institutional agility required to effectively address the DRC’s protracted conflicts. This divergence between codified law and practical application is not merely a technical issue; rather, it reflects deeper tensions involving state sovereignty, regional rivalries, economic interests, and divergent security priorities.[4] Beyond African institutions, this article also evaluates the United Nations’ role, particularly through the lens of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which outlines mechanisms for regional and global cooperation. Although the UN recognizes the AU as a crucial partner in African peace operations, cooperation between these institutions has been uneven, often marked by disagreements over mandate scope, decision-making authority, and operational leadership.[5] The DRC case vividly illustrates these challenges, as international peacekeeping missions have struggled to reconcile respect for Congolese sovereignty with the responsibility to protect civilians in a volatile and fragmented security environment. The UN’s own limitations, including geopolitical divisions within the Security Council and restrictive peacekeeping mandates, further complicate the implementation of robust protection measures.
This article therefore undertakes a comprehensive analysis of why regional and global frameworks have demonstrably struggled to address conflict in the DRC effectively. It explores the theoretical foundations of regional security governance, examines specific legal mandates, analyzes institutional failures, and identifies operational challenges that diminish intervention capacity. Ultimately, the article posits that resolving the DRC’s security crisis necessitates more than internal reforms within the Congolese state; it demands structural transformation within regional and global security systems, including clearer mandate harmonization, improved burden-sharing mechanisms, stronger enforcement, and a political commitment to prioritize civilian protection over competing geopolitical interests.
The analysis presented here contributes to academic discourse on regionalism, sovereignty, and conflict intervention by offering a synthesized legal and political examination of the Great Lakes security architecture. This article proposes a reform agenda aimed at strengthening the capacity of African regional organizations to prevent, manage, and resolve complex conflicts such as that in the DRC. In doing so, it frames the DRC not solely as a site of conflict but as a critical case study for evaluating Africa’s evolving approach to collective security and international legal obligations.
Methodology
This article employs a methodology combining doctrinal legal analysis with a single case study. Doctrinal analysis involves the systematic examination of relevant legal instruments, treaties, protocols, resolutions, and institutional mandates to identify normative commitments and assess implementation gaps. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was selected as the case study due to its illustrative nature regarding the fragmentation and operational challenges prevalent within the Great Lakes region. Data sources include primary legal texts, specifically the AU Constitutive Act, PSC Protocol, SADC Treaty, ICGLR Pact, EAC Treaty, and pertinent UN Security Council resolutions, alongside secondary scholarly literature. While comparative insights from organizations such as ECOWAS, AMISOM, and the European Union are incorporated where relevant to highlight alternative models, the primary analytical focus remains on the DRC.
Theoretical Foundations for Regional Conflict Governance
Regional conflict governance in Africa is fundamentally structured by a diverse set of theoretical, legal, and institutional concepts that collectively influence how African regional and sub-regional organizations address crises such as the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).[6] These theoretical foundations derive from international relations, legal theory, regionalism studies, and peace and security scholarship. A comprehensive understanding of these conceptual underpinnings is essential for analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of Africa’s evolving security architecture and the specific challenges underscored by the DRC case.
Regionalism and Collective Security
At the core of regional conflict governance lies the theory of regionalism, which describes the processes through which states within a defined geographical area coordinate cooperation on political, economic, or security objectives. Scholars such as Acharya and Buzan and Wæver contend that regions frequently develop shared threat perceptions, common values, and overlapping political interests that render collective security responses both feasible and necessary.[7] In Africa, the African Union (AU) and sub-regional organizations like SADC, EAC, ICGLR, and ECOWAS exemplify institutional expressions of regionalism. These institutions are predicated on the belief that states facing interconnected security challenges benefit from shared mechanisms for prevention, mediation, enforcement, and post-conflict reconstruction.
Regionalism also informs African collective security doctrines, which emphasize regional ownership of peace processes. The AU Constitutive Act, particularly Article 4(h), signifies a departure from the Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) strict non-interference doctrine towards a more proactive approach that recognizes regional responsibility to address atrocities and unconstitutional changes of government. This evolving norm positions African institutions as central actors in addressing regional crises such as that in the DRC, though the scope of said institutional authority and their overall effectiveness on dealing with conflicts remain subjects of ongoing debate.[8]
Security Complex Theory and Interdependence
A second crucial theoretical foundation is regional security complex theory (RSCT). Buzan and Wæver conceptualize regions, such as the Great Lakes, as security complexes where the security concerns of states are so interconnected that no single country can achieve stability in isolation.[9] Threats frequently transcend borders, and domestic conflicts generate regional externalities, thereby rendering unilateral responses inadequate. The Great Lakes region serves as a prime example of this dynamic. Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania, Angola, and the DRC are interconnected by shared borders, overlapping ethnic communities, transnational armed groups, and cross-border economic networks. Instability in one state inevitably impacts the entire region. This interdependence justifies the necessity for collective mechanisms to manage conflict and prevent escalation. However, it also introduces vulnerabilities, as competing national interests often impede cooperative action. The DRC illustrates how regional security complexes can be characterized by rivalry, mistrust, and divergent intervention logics, which collectively weaken the capacity for collective security.[10]
Subsidiarity and Multilevel Governance
The AU’s peace and security architecture is also guided by the principle of subsidiarity, which posits that decision-making authority should reside at the lowest effective level. In practice, this implies that sub-regional organizations are often expected to assume leading roles in early response and localized conflict management, with the AU providing strategic direction and the UN offering support and legitimacy when broader enforcement is required. Subsidiarity aims to enhance responsiveness by empowering actors closest to a conflict to take the initiative. Nevertheless, the DRC case highlights substantial weaknesses in the practical application of subsidiarity. SADC, the EAC, and the ICGLR have each attempted to lead initiatives in the DRC, frequently without adequate coordination and, at times, in direct competition with one another. These rivalries undermine the theoretical promise of subsidiarity, demonstrating how political interests of member states can compromise otherwise sound institutional designs.[11]
Legal Pluralism and Overlapping Mandates
African regional conflict governance is further characterized by legal pluralism, where multiple international and regional legal frameworks coexist and occasionally conflict. The AU Constitutive Act, the SADC Mutual Defense Pact, the ICGLR Pact on Security, Stability and Development, and the EAC Treaty all contain overlapping provisions concerning intervention, conflict mediation, and peace operations. Theoretically, this pluralism should establish a robust framework; in practice, however, it frequently generates confusion, mandate duplication, and institutional friction. The DRC case vividly exposes these contradictions. The EAC Regional Force, SADC missions, and AU frameworks have each asserted authority to intervene or mediate, yet without a unified hierarchy or a coordinated mechanism. This undermines legal clarity and diminishes the effectiveness of their conflict interventions.
International Legal Theory and Chapter VIII of the UN Charter
Another foundational element of regional conflict governance is the international legal recognition of regional organizations under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.[12] This chapter encourages regional entities to assume primary responsibility for conflict resolution, provided their actions align with UN principles and they maintain communication with the Security Council. For Africa, this presents both an opportunity and a limitation. It enables African leadership in peace operations but simultaneously subjects regional interventions to political constraints imposed by the Security Council. In practice, the DRC case reveals the structural difficulty of balancing UN oversight with regional autonomy. African-led initiatives frequently lack the resources, logistical support, or political legitimacy that UN involvement can provide, while UN missions, such as MONUSCO, confront limitations in mandate strength, enforcement authority, and political backing.[13] These theoretical perspectives collectively underscore a core argument of this article. Africa’s regional conflict governance system, while normatively ambitious, is structurally constrained. Regionalism, collective security, subsidiarity, and Chapter VIII of the UN Charter establish a strong conceptual basis for African leadership in peace and security. However, the DRC demonstrates how political fragmentation, mandate overlaps, and competing intervention logics weaken the existing regional and international institutional system in practical application.
Regional Legal Mandates in Africa
The African continent possesses one of the most comprehensive regional peace and security architectures in the Global South. This framework is anchored in the AU Constitutive Act, supplemented by the PSC Protocol, and further reinforced by the legal instruments of sub-regional organizations such as SADC, ICGLR, and the EAC. These legal mandates articulate shared commitments to conflict prevention, early warning, mediation, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and post-conflict reconstruction. However, as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) conflict demonstrates, robust normative foundations do not automatically translate into coherent or effective action. Understanding the specific legal mandates that guide African regional responses to conflict is therefore crucial for analyzing the persistent implementation gaps.
The African Union’s Constitutive Act and Article 4(h)
The AU Constitutive Act represents a transformative shift in African regional governance. Article 4(h) grants the Union «the right to intervene in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.»[14] This provision signifies a departure from the Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) principle of non-interference, positioning the AU as a norm entrepreneur in the field of civilian protection. Theoretically, Article 4(h) provides a strong legal basis for intervention in contexts like the DRC, where mass atrocities and widespread violence have been extensively documented. Nevertheless, despite its explicit legal language, Article 4(h) has never been formally invoked in the DRC. Political sensitivities concerning state sovereignty, apprehensions about creating reciprocal precedents, and the competing interests of key member states have collectively deterred the Peace and Security Council (PSC) from operationalizing this norm. The DRC case thus reveals a fundamental tension between the AU’s normative ambition, regional bodies’ internal and external rivalries, and the political realities faced by its members.
The PSC Protocol and Continental Peacekeeping Mandates
The PSC Protocol strengthens the AU’s intervention mandate and delineates a comprehensive architecture for peace and security governance.[15] Key mechanisms include the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), the Panel of the Wise, and the Peace Fund. In principle, these mechanisms empower the AU to lead conflict prevention efforts and respond swiftly to crises. Yet, in the context of the DRC, these tools have not been fully utilized. The ASF remains only partially operational, the Peace Fund suffers from chronic underfinancing, and CEWS warnings frequently fail to trigger decisive PSC action. This disparity underscores a larger structural issue: the AU’s operational capacity in dealing with conflict resolution or humanitarian operations has not kept pace with its legal mandates.
SADC’s Peace and Security Mandates
SADC’s security framework comprises the SADC Treaty[16], the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation (OPDSC), and the SADC Mutual Defense Pact. These instruments authorize SADC to intervene when a member state is threatened, support constitutional order, and deploy peace operations based on collective defense principles. SADC has historically demonstrated a greater propensity to deploy robust forces, as seen in Lesotho (1998), Mozambique (SAMIM 2021), and the DRC during the early 2000s and again in 2023. However, contemporary SADC action in the DRC has largely been confined to political mediation and selective security support. Rivalries between Anglophone and Francophone blocs, competing economic interests, and differing alignments with Congolese leadership have practically constrained SADC’s authority.
ICGLR and Conflict-Specific Mandates
The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) is uniquely positioned as the only sub-regional institution specifically established to address conflict drivers within the DRC and its neighboring states. The ICGLR Pact on Security, Stability and Development includes a Non-Aggression and Mutual Defense Protocol, a Protocol on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, a Regional Initiative on the Control of Small Arms, and joint monitoring mechanisms for armed group movements. Despite its conflict-specific scope, the ICGLR lacks intrinsic enforcement capacity. Its role has predominantly been limited to diplomatic initiatives and crisis summits, such as the Luanda and Nairobi processes. The absence of binding enforcement mechanisms undermines its ability to effectively influence complex crises.
EAC Treaty and Regional Force Deployment Authority
The East African Community (EAC) expanded its role in regional security with the launch of the EAC Regional Force (EACRF) in 2022. The EAC Treaty provides mechanisms for mutual defense, conflict resolution, security cooperation, and peace support operations. Nevertheless, the EAC’s intervention in the DRC revealed notable legal ambiguities. The EACRF operated with limited enforcement authority, unclear rules of engagement, and inconsistent political backing from member states. Its withdrawal in 2023 reflected these legal and political disagreements, thereby illustrating the inherent limitations of sub-regional forces operating without a clear mandate or unified vision to resolve complex cases like the one in the DRC.
Hybrid Peacekeeping Models: Pathways to Sustainable Peace in the DRC
Hybrid peacekeeping models have gained increasing salience in global conflict governance, particularly in contexts where regional organizations possess insufficient resources, logistical capacity, or political legitimacy to operate independently. These models entail shared authority between regional bodies and global institutions, most frequently the United Nations. Hybrid missions are designed to capitalize on regional proximity and contextual understanding while simultaneously benefiting from UN resources, normative backing, and international legitimacy. This section analyzes the rationale behind hybrid peacekeeping, explores relevant empirical examples, and evaluates their applicability to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
The Rationale Behind Hybrid Peacekeeping
Hybrid peacekeeping emerged as a direct response to the inherent limitations of both purely regional and purely UN-led operations. Scholars contend that neither regional bodies nor the UN can unilaterally manage complex, multidimensional conflicts in fragile states. Regional organizations often offer superior political insight and faster deployment capabilities but are frequently constrained by resource shortages and weaker global legitimacy. The UN, conversely, possesses substantial logistical capabilities and normative authority but is often hindered by slow decision-making processes and geopolitical divisions within the United Nations Security Council. Consequently, hybrid missions represent a compromise solution that integrates these complementary strengths. Key characteristics typically include shared command and decision-making authority, joint planning and operational frameworks, UN-backed logistical support for regional troops, regional political leadership with international oversight, and blended funding models. These mechanisms aim to achieve a balance among political legitimacy, operational capacity, and collective burden-sharing.
AMIS-UNAMID: The First Fully Hybrid Mission
The joint African Union (AU) and UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), deployed in 2007, remains the most prominent empirical example of a fully hybrid peacekeeping mission. Its establishment followed the earlier AU mission in Sudan (AMIS), which had been overwhelmed by escalating violence, burgeoning humanitarian needs, and severe logistical constraints. UNAMID demonstrated that hybrid command structures, while administratively complex, can significantly enhance both the legitimacy and operational successes for peace missions in Africa.
Lessons from AMISOM: Hybrid Support Without Joint Command
While the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was not formally designated a hybrid mission, it operated under a hybrid operational logic. The AU provided troops and political leadership, while the UN delivered financing and logistics through the UN Support Office for Somalia (UNSOS). AMISOM’s effectiveness was partly attributable to the UN’s provision of critical enablers such as transport aircraft, medical facilities, and other force multipliers. Unlike MONUSCO, which is largely constrained by Chapter VI principles, AMISOM operated with an enforcement mandate rooted in the AU’s willingness to undertake more robust actions. This suggests that even in the absence of a fully integrated joint command, hybrid support arrangements can substantially augment mission effectiveness.
Addressing Regional Fragmentation in the DRC Through Hybrid Models
The primary challenge in the DRC is not solely insecurity but also the multiplicity of actors asserting authority. The AU, SADC, EAC, and ICGLR each initiate their own interventions, creating fragmented and often parallel efforts. A hybrid AU-UN mission could mitigate this fragmentation through several mechanisms: First, it would establish a unified command structure, replacing concurrent EACRF, SADC, MONUSCO, and ICGLR monitoring efforts with centralized authority. Second, it would enhance legitimacy, as regional actors typically place greater trust in the AU, while international donors tend to trust the UN more; a hybrid mission could thus balance these distinct legitimacy deficits and make the peace process possible. Third, it would reduce rivalries by minimizing the operational space for competing interventions through a shared command framework. Scholars have noted that hybrid arrangements can mitigate inter-organizational rivalry by clarifying roles of each mission. Fourth, it would improve resource mobilization by facilitating access to donor support via the United Nations while ensuring African strategic oversight. Finally, it would resolve mandate overlaps by establishing a single, coherent mandate, rather than having disparate sub-regional initiatives which in various cases come up with their own initiative that end up in overlapping mandates against one another.
Conclusion
This article has critically examined the regional and international legal frameworks governing conflict resolution in the Great Lakes region, with the Democratic Republic of the Congo serving as a central case study. The analysis reveals a persistent disjunction between Africa’s ambitious normative commitments, as embodied in the AU Constitutive Act, the PSC Protocol, and sub-regional instruments, and the operational reality of fragmented, under-resourced, and politically constrained interventions. The DRC’s protracted instability is attributed not to an absence of legal mandates, but rather to overlapping authorities, deficient enforcement mechanisms, and a lack of a strong and sustainable peace plan and political will among member states. The theoretical foundations of regionalism, security complex theory, subsidiarity, and Chapter VIII of the UN Charter establish a strong conceptual basis for collective action. However, the DRC case demonstrates how competing national interests and institutional rivalries can neutralize these principles in practice. To address these structural deficiencies, the article proposes for a harmonization of regional and domestic laws on armed group accountability, having a binding cross-border early warning and mediation protocol and for the DRC to have enforceable legal provisions for natural resource governance.
Furthermore, hybrid peacekeeping models, drawing lessons from UNAMID and AMISOM, present a viable mechanism to mitigate fragmentation, unify command structures, and effectively balance regional legitimacy with UN resources. Ultimately, achieving durable peace in the Great Lakes region necessitates not only legal and institutional redesign but also genuine political commitment from member states and localized ownership of justice processes. Future research should empirically evaluate the proposed framework in the DRC against other conflict-affected regions in Africa and investigate whether there is any relevance for member states and regional organizations to cede authority to hybrid mechanisms.
[1] Keza, M. (2024). The Great Lakes security complex: A regional approach to peace. African Security Review, 33(2), 201-215. DOI: 10.1080/10246029.2024.2304567.
[2] Mulyanyuma, A. (2026). African Union Peace and Security Mechanisms: Responses to Conflicts in Africa. Journal of International and Comparative Development, 1-32. DOI: 10.36941/jicd-2026-0014.
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[11] United Nations Charter, Chapter VIII (Regional Arrangements). Entered into force 24 October 1945. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-8.
[12] UN Charter, Chapter VIII
[13] Williams, P. D. (2020). AMISOM and the limits of African peacekeeping, International Affairs, 96(4), 1011-1030. DOI: 10.1093/ia/iiaa032.
[14] African Union Constitutive Act, Article 4(h). Adopted 11 July 2000, entered into force 26 May 2001. Available at: https://au.int/en/constitutive-act.
[15] Karlsrud, J. (2019). From liberal peacebuilding to stabilization and counter-terrorism,International,Peacekeeping,26(1),14-32.DOI: 10.1080/13533312.2018.1502040.
[16] Конева А.Е., Солнцев А.М. Трибунал САДК: вчера, сегодня, завтра // Азия и Африка сегодня. 2014. N 2. С. 42-46
Information about the author:
Msafiri Mabera,
PhD student, Department of International law, RUDN University
Информация об авторе:
Мсафири Мабера,
аспирант кафедры международного права юридического института РУДН
Изображение сгенерировано нейросетью Open AI
